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ARTICLES
COMMUNICATION AND COMPETENCE
FOR SELF-REPRESENTATION
E. Lea Johnston*
In Indiana v. Edwards, the U.S. Supreme Court held that states may
impose a higher competency standard for self-representation than to stand
trial in criminal cases. While the Court articulated a number of interests
relevant to representational competence, it left to states the difficult task of
formulating an actual competence standard. This Article offers the first
examination and assessment of the constitutionality of state standards postEdwards. It reveals that seven states have endorsed a representational
competence standard with a communication component. Additionally,
twenty states have embraced vague, capacious standards that could
consider communication skills. In applying these standards, states have
denied a defendant’s self-representation because of his stuttering, strong
foreign accent, and low level of education, even when the defendant has
intact decision-making abilities.
However, the extent to which the Sixth Amendment permits denial of selfrepresentation on the basis of inadequate communication skills is dubious.
Edwards indicates the relevance of expressive abilities to representational
competence, yet Faretta v. California warns that trial courts should not
expect strong advocacy skills from pro se litigants. Moreover, McKaskle v.
Wiggins construes self-representation as a bundle of distinct rights of
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control and performance, suggesting that a court should permit a
decisionally competent defendant to control his case even if he requires
assistance to perform it. This Article reconciles these three cases and
proposes a normative theory to balance the competing concerns of
autonomy, fairness, and accuracy that are implicated when defendants
proceed pro se. It identifies four categories of communication impairments
of varying constitutional significance and subjects these categories to this
normative theory to discern the extent to which they should constitute
cognizable grounds for representational incompetence. This analysis
reveals that existing state competency standards are constitutionally
suspect. This Article suggests substantive revisions to state standards and
offers a model, two-pronged competence standard for self-representation
that would withstand constitutional scrutiny and ensure that a defendant
has the necessary capacities both to control and to conduct his defense.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Indiana v. Edwards1 that the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments permit trial courts to impose a higher
competency standard for self-representation than that required to stand
trial.2 The issue presented in that case was whether a trial court must
permit a severely mentally ill defendant to represent himself at trial when he
was found competent to stand trial and to have effected a valid waiver of
counsel.3 In addressing this narrow question, the Court did not need to
specify which components of a representational competence standard would
survive constitutional scrutiny.4 However, a close reading of Edwards
provides some clues. The opinion demonstrates the important relationship
between a defendant’s severe mental illness and his cognitive powers of
understanding, reasoning, and appreciation.5 Other portions indicate the
relevance of a defendant’s expressive abilities and functional abilities to
perform discrete trial tasks.6 The opinion also manifests concern for a
number of values implicated when a gray-area defendant represents himself,
including the defendant’s autonomy, the reliability of the conviction and
sentence, and the actual and apparent fairness of the adjudication.7
However, Edwards left unclear how states should actually weigh these
competing concerns and which disabilities might justify denying the right

1. 554 U.S. 164 (2008).
2. In this Article, the terms “competence” and “competency” are used interchangeably.
These terms refer to the legal judgment of which functional abilities are necessary to trigger
the application of various legal rules. This Article also uses “abilities” and “capacities”
interchangeably.
3. Id. at 169; see also id. at 182 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4. The term “representational competence” refers to those abilities that a defendant
should possess in order to represent himself at trial. E. Lea Johnston, Representational
Competence: Defining the Limits of the Right to Self-Representation at Trial, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 523, 528 n.30 (2011). Scholars have proposed a range of representational
competence standards of varying degrees of specificity. See id. at 595; see also Alan R.
Felthous, Competency to Waive Counsel: A Step Beyond Competency to Stand Trial, 7 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 471, 476 (1979); Jason R. Marks, State Competence Standards for SelfRepresentation in a Criminal Trial: Opportunity and Danger for State Courts After Indiana
v. Edwards, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 825, 847–48 (2010); Peter R. Silten & Richard Tullis, Mental
Competency in Criminal Proceedings, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1053, 1068 (1977); Christopher
Slobogin, Mental Illness and Self-Representation: Faretta, Godinez and Edwards, 7 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 391, 410 (2009).
5. See infra notes 28–30, 237–60 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
7. See Edwards, 554 U.S. at 174–77. The Edwards case defines a “gray-area
defendant” as one who is competent to stand trial but, because of a severe mental illness,
may be incompetent to represent himself at trial. See id. at 172–73 (stating that relevant
defendants have “a mental condition that falls in a gray area between Dusky’s minimal
constitutional requirement that measures a defendant’s ability to stand trial and a somewhat
higher standard that measures mental fitness for another legal purpose”).
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of self-representation. As a result, jurisdictions have adopted differing and
often vague standards for representational competence.8 This tangle of
ambiguous and contradictory standards is troubling because state thresholds
for the exercise of federal constitutional rights generally should not vary.
Moreover, the problem of representational competence is not uncommon; it
is formally raised in scores of cases that proceed to trial and is likely an
explicit or implicit issue in thousands of cases that are resolved through
guilty pleas or dismissals.
This Article offers the first comprehensive and critical examination of
how states have responded to Edwards.9 This analysis shows that, as of
May 2015, thirty-one states have accepted Edwards’s invitation to adopt a
heightened representational competence standard.10 Of these, twenty
states’ standards parrot the vague language in Edwards and generally
permit trial courts to deny self-representation when defendants “are not
competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.”11 Four states have
articulated more detailed standards that involve only decisional abilities.12
In contrast, seven states—Alaska, California, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming—have embraced competence standards that
assess a defendant’s ability to communicate with the trier of fact or present
a meaningful defense.13 Cases reveal that, particularly when incompetence
does not hinge on severe mental illness, such standards can operate to
deprive fully rational, autonomous defendants of the right to control their
defense.14
Edwards expressly sidestepped the question of whether a representational
competence standard with a “coherent communication” requirement would
pass constitutional muster.15 This Article seeks to resolve that question,
now urgent in light of the use of similar standards in states with nearly sixty
million people.16 An examination of case law reveals that state courts’
findings of representational incompetence may respond to a variety of
impairments, including disordered speech, an inability to communicate in a
timely fashion, stuttering, strong foreign accent, low level of educational
attainment, or tendency to ramble.17 These categories of impairment differ
in the extent to which they reflect cognitive dysfunction, stem from a

8. See infra Part I.A–C.
9. See Marks, supra note 4, at 835–41 (outlining the choices available to states after
Edwards and detailing the few standards adopted as of 2010).
10. See infra Part I.
11. See infra note 44; Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178.
12. See infra notes 55–59.
13. See infra Part I.C.
14. See infra Part I.D.1–2.
15. See Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178 (voicing uncertainty “as to how that particular
standard would work in practice”).
16. See State and County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.
gov/qfd/index.html (last updated May 28, 2015) (providing links to the 2014 population
estimates for Alaska, California, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Wyoming)
[https://perma.cc/95EF-JLKC].
17. See infra Part I.B.
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mental illness, and are susceptible to amelioration by hybrid counsel.18
Because competence is ultimately a legal and moral judgment,19 any
determination of the components of a competency standard must derive
from a weighing of the values animating and implicated by selfrepresentation.
Drawing on Supreme Court case law, this Article articulates and defends
a normative conception of representational competence that balances the
competing interests of autonomy, accuracy, and fairness.20 It then engages
in a fine-grained analysis of the constellation of Supreme Court cases
establishing and limiting the right to self-representation to discern guidance
for the import of communication to representational competence.21 One
notable insight, largely overlooked by commentators to date, is the Court’s
construal of self-representation as a bundle of distinct rights of control and
performance.22 Impairments affecting defendants’ communicative abilities
largely implicate the latter right, but not the former. This distinction holds
profound implications for the nature of representational competence and
possible responsibilities of hybrid counsel.
This Article applies these insights to four categories of communication
impairments—those involving disordered speech, an inability to be
understood by courtroom actors, an inability to communicate in a timely
fashion, and suboptimal advocacy—to identify which impairments warrant
a denial of the rights to control or to conduct one’s defense.23 These
conclusions reveal the likely unconstitutionality of certain state standards
and provide grist for suggested modifications to others. This Article
concludes with a model representational competence standard that accords
sufficient respect for a defendant’s autonomy, avoids grave threats to
accuracy and fairness, and comports with Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence.24
Part I of this Article discusses the results of the fifty-state survey on
states’ approaches to representational competence. It provides a detailed
examination of the seven states with communication-based representational
competence standards and generates a taxonomy of four categories of
communication impairments that may hold differing constitutional
significance. Part II articulates a normative lens that balances competing
values of autonomy, accuracy, and fairness and closely examines Supreme
Court case law on the proper relationship between communicative abilities
18. See infra Part III.B–E. For a working definition of hybrid counsel, see Joseph A.
Colquitt, Hybrid Representation: Standing the Two-Sided Coin on Its Edge, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 55, 56–57 (2003) (“[Hybrid representation] consists of the concurrent
representation by counsel for an accused and the accused appearing pro se. In other words,
in a case of hybrid representation, the accused and an attorney essentially function as ‘cocounsel.’”).
19. See infra notes 147–48 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 (1984).
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra notes 336–52 and accompanying text.
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and representational competence. Part III then applies this normative lens
and understanding to the four categories of communication impairments,
discerns which kinds of impairments should constitute grounds for denial of
the right to control or to conduct one’s defense, and draws conclusions for
state representational competence standards. This Article concludes by
offering a model approach to representational competence.
I. A PATCHWORK OF REPRESENTATIONAL
COMPETENCE STANDARDS AFTER EDWARDS
In Edwards, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Constitution permits
states to deny self-representation to defendants competent enough to stand
trial but whose severe mental illnesses render them incompetent to proceed
pro se.25 The Court recognized:
In certain instances an individual may well be able to satisfy Dusky’s
mental competence standard, for he will be able to work with counsel at
trial, yet at the same time he may be unable to carry out the basic tasks
needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel.26

While the Court declined to adopt a particular representational competence
standard, Edwards suggests that certain abilities may be relevant to this
inquiry. First, in focusing on the “mental condition”27 or “mental fitness”28
of the pro se defendant, the Court appeared to care centrally about his
adjudicative competence, or powers of understanding, reasoning, and
appreciation.29 Regarding defendant Edwards, the Court stressed his
disordered and delusional thinking, which were manifestations of his
schizophrenia.30 Second, the Court highlighted the importance of a
defendant’s expressive ability and drew attention to Edwards’s rambling
and nonsensical motions, which revealed his disordered thinking.31 Third,
the Court listed the following conditions as impeding self-representation:
“disorganized thinking, deficits in sustaining attention and
concentration[,] . . . anxiety, and other common symptoms of severe mental
illnesses.”32 Finally, the Court observed that a pro se defendant will likely
need to perform a range of common trial tasks, including “organization of

25. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178 (2008).
26. Id. at 175–76. The competence to stand trial standard was established in Dusky v.
United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), which held that, to stand trial, a defendant must possess
“sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding” and “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him.” Id.
27. See Edwards, 554 U.S. at 172.
28. See id. The Court also used the terms “mental capacity,” see id. at 174–77, and
“mental competency,” see id. at 170–72, 174–75.
29. See id. at 176 (quoting N. POYTHRESS ET AL., ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE: THE
MACARTHUR STUDIES 103 (Kluwer Academic 2002)); see also infra notes 241–51 and
accompanying text (describing the concept of adjudicative competence in more detail).
30. See Edwards, 554 U.S. at 168.
31. See id. at 176.
32. Id. (quoting Brief for Am. Psychiatric Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae at 26, Edwards,
554 U.S. 164 (No. 07-208), 2008 WL 405546).
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defense, making motions, arguing points of law, participating in voir dire,
questioning witnesses, and addressing the court and jury.”33 How might
these capacities and tasks inform a representational competency standard?
May a state include in its competency standard any cognitive,
communicative, and performance-related ability useful for selfrepresentation? Edwards does not provide a definitive answer to these
questions.
In the eight years following Edwards, states have generated a patchwork
of competency standards for self-representation. This constitutes an odd
and uncomfortable arrangement because state thresholds for the exercise of
federal constitutional rights typically should not vary.34 A fifty-state survey
conducted in May 2015 revealed that states differ in their desire to impose a
higher competency standard for self-representation than to stand trial, level
of specificity in the components of a representational competence standard,
and extent to which those standards extend beyond cognitive abilities to
capture elements of performance.35 States also diverge in whether trial
courts may or must apply a heightened representational competence
standard to a gray-area defendant.36 Research reveals that five states have
affirmed that their competency standards for self-representation are the
same as the standard to stand trial articulated in Dusky v. United States,37

33. Id. (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 (1984)).
34. See Marks, supra note 4, at 834; State v. Connor, 973 A.2d 627, 650 n.22 (Conn.
2009); see also Alan R. Felthous & Lauren E. Flynn, From Competence to Waive Counsel to
Competence to Represent Oneself: The Supreme Court Advances Fairness in Edwards, 33
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 14, 16 (2009) (warning of “the unfairness of
diverse, unequal application of legal procedures”).
35. See infra Part I. For purposes of this analysis, I assume that a state has adopted a
representational competence standard of a certain type if such a standard is reflected in a
state statute, rule, or decision by any court in the state, so long as no higher court in that state
has disproved of that standard. Because Edwards is a fairly recent decision, many state
supreme courts have not yet addressed whether to embrace a higher competency standard for
self-representation than to stand trial; therefore many of the opinions cited herein derive
from lower courts. The analysis includes both reported and unreported cases, although the
latter clearly have less precedential value, and reflects both statements crucial to a court’s
holding as well as those made in dicta.
36. See supra note 7 (defining “gray-area defendant”). Some states hold that Edwards
only applies to denials of pro se motions and that no constitutional violation occurs if a court
allows a severely mentally ill defendant who is competent to stand trial to proceed pro se so
long as his waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 267
P.3d 1125, 1132 (Cal. 2012); Duckett v. State, 769 S.E.2d 743, 748 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015);
State v. Newson, 767 S.E.2d 913, 920 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015). Other states, however, hold
that Edwards imposes a duty on trial courts to investigate the competence of severely
mentally ill defendants desiring to proceed pro se. These states permit gray-area defendants
who were allowed to represent themselves at trial to challenge on appeal a trial court’s
failure to apply a heightened standard of representational competence. See, e.g., Connor, 973
A.2d at 655; State v. Leahy, 854 N.W.2d 73, No. 13-0522, 2014 Iowa App. LEXIS 689 at
*21 (Ct. App. July 16, 2014); State v. Holdsworth, 798 A.2d 917, 924 (R.I. 2002).
37. 362 U.S. 402 (1960); see Stewart-Bey v. State, 96 A.3d 825, 839 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2014); State v. Foss, A09-2152, 2010 WL 4068708, at *4 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2010);
Mathis v. State, 271 P.3d 67, 74 n.21 (Okla. Crim. App. 2012); State v. Barnes, 753 S.E.2d
545, 550 (S.C. 2014); State v. Maestas, 299 P.3d 892, 962 n.330 (Utah 2012). In at least
some of these states, a trial court will consider a defendant’s mental illness when assessing
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and fourteen states have yet to address the effect of Edwards on their
representational competence standards.38
This part focuses on the thirty-one states that have accepted, or have
indicated a willingness to accept,39 Edwards’s invitation to impose a
heightened representational competence standard.40 While most states have
endorsed a vague standard that simply parrots language in Edwards,41 a
minority of states have adopted detailed standards that either eschew42 or
embrace43 communicative abilities.
A. Vague, Heightened Standards
Of the thirty-one states that have adopted heightened competency
standards for self-representation, twenty have failed to embellish that
standard beyond the Court’s general language in Edwards.44 The standard
the validity of his waiver of counsel. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 524 A.2d 117, 172 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1987); Gardner v. State, 570 S.E.2d 184, 186 (S.C. 2002).
38. These states include Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and
West Virginia.
39. See supra note 35. For an example of relevant dicta, see Commonwealth v. Means,
907 N.E.2d 646, 661 (Mass. 2009) (“We are, moreover, mindful of the admonition of the
United States Supreme Court, which recently ‘caution[ed] against the use of a single mental
competency standard for deciding both (1) whether a defendant who is represented by
counsel can proceed to trial and (2) whether a defendant who goes to trial must be permitted
to represent himself . . . .’” (citations omitted)).
40. This figure includes twenty states that have adopted general, vague standards for
representational competence that exceed the Dusky standard to stand trial, see infra note 44,
seven states that have adopted standards with a communication component, see infra Part
I.C, and four states that have adopted standards that either consist solely of decisional
abilities or explicitly exclude communication abilities, see infra Part I.B.
41. See infra Part I.A.
42. See infra Part I.B.
43. See infra Part I.C.
44. See FL. R. CRIM. P. 3.111(d)(3) (“Regardless of the defendant’s legal skills or the
complexity of the case, the court shall not deny a defendant’s unequivocal request to
represent himself or herself, if the court makes a determination of record that the
defendant . . . does not suffer from severe mental illness to the point where the defendant is
not competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself or herself.”); State v. Svanoe, No. 1
CA-CR 08-0942, 2009 WL 5149956, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2009) (quoting Indiana
v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 161, 178 (2008)); State v. Hawkins, 229 P.3d 379, 384 (Idaho App.
2009) (quoting Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178); People v. Sheley, 964 N.E.2d 170, 174 (Ill. App.
Ct 2012) (“[T]he Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for
those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental
illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by
themselves.” (quoting Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178)); State v. Brown, No. 103, 425, 2011 WL
3658364, at *7 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2011) (quoting Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178); Stinnett
v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 70, 82 (Ky. 2011) (citing Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178);
Commonwealth v. Means, 907 N.E.2d 646, 661 (Mass. 2009) (noting “the admonition of the
United States Supreme Court [that] ‘caution[ed] against the use of a single mental
competency standard for deciding both (1) whether a defendant who is represented by
counsel can proceed to trial and (2) whether a defendant who goes to trial must be permitted
to represent himself’” (citations omitted)); People v. Brooks, 809 N.W.2d 644, 653 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2011), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 807 N.W.2d 303 (Mich. 2012) (citing
Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178); State v. Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d 600, 609–10 (Mo. 2009) (en
banc) (“In certain instances an individual may well be able to satisfy [the] mental
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from Idaho is typical: “[T]he Constitution does not forbid a state from
insisting upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to
stand trial but who suffer from mental illness to the point where they are not
competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.”45 Others resemble
this standard from Missouri:
In certain instances an individual may well be able to satisfy [the] mental
competence standard, for he will be able to work with counsel at trial, yet
at the same time he may be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to
present his own defense without the help of counsel.46

A few states with vague, heightened representational competence standards
adopted these standards prior to Edwards by appealing to a defendant’s
right to a fair trial.47 Seventeen of the twenty states dictate that, to deny

competence standard, for he will be able to work with counsel at trial, yet at the same time
he may be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the
help of counsel.” (citation omitted)); State v. Lewis, 785 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Neb. 2010)
(holding “that under [Nebraska’s constitution], a criminal defendant’s right to conduct his or
her own defense is not violated when the court determines that a defendant competent to
stand trial nevertheless suffers from severe mental illness to the point where he or she is not
competent to conduct trial proceedings without counsel,” and declining to adopt a more
specific standard); Wiesner v. State, No. 64373, 2014 WL 4670115, at *1 (Nev. Sept. 18,
2014) (quoting Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178); State v. McNeil, 963 A.2d 358, 365 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2009) (“[A] defendant may be competent to stand trial if represented by
counsel, but not have the ‘ability to play the significantly expanded role required for selfrepresentation.’”); State v. Lane, 707 S.E.2d 210, 219 (N.C. 2011) (stating that a trial court
may deny a pro se motion if “the defendant falls into the ‘gray area’ and is therefore subject
to the ‘competency limitation’ described in Edwards,” and instructing that “[t]he trial court
must make findings of fact to support its determination that the defendant is ‘unable to carry
out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel’”); State v.
Dahl, 776 N.W.2d 37, 44 (N.D. 2009) (“District courts can reject a defendant’s waiver of the
right to counsel if the defendant suffers from mental illness or impairment such that the
defendant would not be competent to conduct trial proceedings without counsel, even if the
defendant is otherwise competent to stand trial.”); State v. Williams, No. 99859, 2014 WL
1327758, at *3–4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2014) (quoting Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178);
Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 759 (Pa. 2014) (“We acknowledge that where a
court has concerns that a defendant seeking to represent himself may be mentally
incompetent to do so, even though the defendant is competent to stand trial, the court may, in
its sound discretion, deny a request to waive the right to counsel and proceed pro se on the
ground that to do otherwise would compromise the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” (citation
omitted)); Chadwick v. State, 309 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting
Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178); State v. Burke, 54 A.3d 500, 509 (Vt. 2012) (observing that “the
Constitution permits judges to take realistic account of the particular defendant’s mental
capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is
mentally competent to do so,” and finding the defendant’s capacity for proceeding pro se
“questionable” but affirming the trial court’s finding that defendant had waived his right to
represent himself due to obstreperous conduct (quoting Edwards, 554 U.S. at 171)); In re
Rhome, 260 P.3d 874, 878 (Wash. 2011) (en banc) (“[I]t is constitutionally permissible for a
state to deny a defendant pro se status ‘on the ground that [he] lacks the mental capacity to
conduct his trial defense’ even though he was found competent to stand trial.” (citation
omitted)); see also infra note 47 (describing the standards of states that adopted a heightened
competence standard for self-representation prior to Edwards on due process grounds).
45. Hawkins, 229 P.3d at 384 (citation omitted).
46. Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d at 609–10 (citations omitted).
47. See Coleman v. State, 914 So.2d 1254, 1255 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (“[The
Mississippi Supreme Court has listed an exception to the defendant’s] right to waive the
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self-representation to a defendant competent to stand trial, the defendant’s
incapacities must stem from a mental illness.48 In fifteen of the twenty
states, the mental illness must be “severe.”49
While hewing to the Court’s language in Edwards likely seemed a safe
tack, these courts’ decisions to refrain from particularizing their
representational competence standards are fraught with danger. Since the
publication of the Edwards decision, forensic clinicians have complained
they lack a “useful,” detailed standard sufficient to enable consistent
judgments on defendants’ competency to proceed pro se.50 Until courts
clearly define the legal standard, forensic psychiatrists and psychologists
cannot select among potentially relevant clinical observations or develop
appropriate assessment instruments.51 Professor Richard Bonnie has
observed that, when a competence assessment lacks normative content, it is
“highly discretionary” and that “forensic clinicians rather than judges

assistance of counsel and represent himself, . . . namely: . . . where the defendant is so
physically or mentally incompetent to speak to the jury that his right to a fair trial is
endangered.”); State v. Reddish, 859 A.2d 1173, 1193 (N.J. 2004) (“The right to selfrepresentation is not absolute. There may be times, during both the guilt phase and penalty
phase [of a capital case], when the defendant will be required to cede control of his defense
to protect the integrity of the State’s interest in fair trials and permit courts to ensure that
their judgments meet the high level of reliability demanded by the Constitution.”); State v.
Kolocotronis, 436 P.2d 774, 779–80 (Wash. 1968) (“[I]f the court determines that [the
defendant] does not have the requisite mental competency to intelligently waive the services
of counsel nor adequate mental competency to act as his own counsel, then his right to a fair
trial and his constitutional right to due process of law, is disregarded if the court permits him
to so act in a criminal case.”).
48. See, e.g., Sheley, 964 N.E. at 174; Lewis, 785 N.W.2d at 840; McNeil, 963 A.2d at
365. But see infra note 49 (noting that Mississippi, Vermont, and Washington may not
expressly require a finding of mental illness to deny the Faretta right on grounds of
competence).
49. Indeed, all twenty states appear to cabin the Edwards limitation to defendants with
“severe” mental illness except Idaho, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Vermont, and Washington.
See Hawkins, 229 P.3d at 383–84 (confining the limiting to defendants with “mental
illness”); Means, 907 N.E.2d at 661 (concerning a “mentally ill defendant’s competence to
waive counsel and self-represent”); Coleman, 914 So. 2d at 1255 (concerning “mentally
incompetent” defendants); Burke, 54 A.3d at 509 (concerning a defendant’s “mental
capacities”); In re Rhome, 260 P.3d at 878, 883 (en banc) (concerning a defendant who
“lacks the mental capacity to conduct his trial defense”). For a discussion of the obscurity of
the meaning of “severe mental illness,” see infra notes 281–84 and accompanying text.
50. See Alan R. Felthous, The Right to Represent Oneself Incompetently: Competency
to Waive Counsel and Conduct One’s Own Defense Before and After Godinez, 18 MENTAL
& PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 105, 109 (1994) (“Merely citing ‘to make one’s defense’ as
a standard, without any elaboration, is too broad and vague to be useful.”); see also Jason
Beaman & Stephen Noffsinger, Competency to Proceed Pro Se, 41 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY L. 583, 585 (2013) (emphasizing “the lack of an accepted standard for
competency to proceed pro se, other than that the decision is made knowingly and
voluntarily”); Andrew Kaufman et al., Survey of Forensic Mental Health Experts on Pro Se
Competence After Indiana v. Edwards, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 565, 565 (2011) (“In
the three years since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Indiana v. Edwards, trial court
judges have been charged with making decisions about self-representational competency
without a specific test to apply.”).
51. Jennifer L. Moore & Katherine Ramsland, Competence Assessment, Diverse
Abilities, and a Pro Se Standard, 39 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 297, 313–14 (2011).
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effectively exercise discretion to define competence.”52 In addition, while
recognition of a vague, heightened standard maximizes trial courts’ ability
to avoid unfair and unreliable trials,53 forensic clinicians and trial courts
within such states will employ in practice a variety of formulations of
representational competence, which will require an appellate court in each
case to decide if the set of considered impairments strays beyond the
bounds of Edwards or the dictates of Faretta v. California.54
B. Standards Limited to Cognitive Capacities
In contrast, at least four states—New York, Colorado, Rhode Island, and
Alabama—have articulated more detailed representational competence
standards that involve only decisional abilities.55 These states frame the
key inquiry as competence to waive the right to counsel, not competence to
represent oneself.56 Recognizing that a mentally ill defendant may lack the
capacity to appreciate the demands inherent in self-representation, New
York and Rhode Island consider a defendant’s mental capacities as part of
the “searching inquiry” designed to assess the efficacy of his waiver of
counsel.57 Similarly, Colorado recognizes that mental illness can impact
both the voluntariness and knowingness of a defendant’s waiver.58
Alabama utilizes the same competency standard for self-representation as to
stand trial but, in both instances, requires that a defendant have a “capacity
to appreciate his position and make a rational choice.”59

52. Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and
Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539, 549–50 (1993).
53. But see Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 189 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Once
the right of self-representation for the mentally ill is a sometime thing, trial judges will have
every incentive to make their lives easier . . . by appointing knowledgeable and literate
counsel.”).
54. 422 U.S. 806 (1975); see Marks, supra note 4, at 838.
55. See Lackey v. State, 104 So.3d 234, 242 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010); People v. Davis,
352 P.3d 950, 955 (Colo. 2015); People v. Stone, 983 N.Y.S.2d 454, 459 (N.Y. 2014); State
v. Holdsworth, 798 A.2d 917, 921 (R.I. 2002).
56. It is arguable that these four states’ approaches, rather than calling for a heighted
standard of representational competence, merely draw attention to the obvious fact that
mental illness can undermine the validity of a defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel. See
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400–01, 401 n.12 (1993).
57. Stone, 983 N.Y.S.2d at 457–58; Holdsworth, 798 A.2d at 921, 924 (applying “a
heightened standard of competency” when a defendant seeks to waive counsel and represent
himself).
58. Davis, 352 P.3d at 956 (explaining that this “analytical framework provides the
standards necessary for trial courts to exercise the discretion described in Edwards” and
“accomplishes the Edwards Court’s objective for trial courts to consider more than just
Dusky when analyzing a mentally ill defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel”).
59. See Lackey, 104 So.3d at 243 (explaining that evaluation involves a determination of
“(1) whether that person suffers from a mental disease, disorder, or defect; (2) whether a
mental disease, disorder, or defect prevents that person from understanding his legal position
and the options available to him; and (3) whether a mental disease, disorder, or defect
prevents that person from making a rational choice among his options” (quoting Hauser ex
rel. Crawford v. Moore, 223 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000)).
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C. Standards Involving Communication or Performance Skills
The balance of the thirty-one states with heightened representational
competence standards includes seven states that have adopted standards
with a communication component. While a trial court potentially could
consider a defendant’s communication abilities under any of the twenty
vague standards discussed above,60 Alaska, California, Connecticut,
Indiana, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have adopted representational
competency standards that contain, explicitly or in practice, a
communication or performance component.61 While all have affirmed the
relevance of a defendant’s communication or performance skills, the
standards differ in the prominence afforded to these abilities in the pro se
inquiry, the range of communication deficiencies recognized, and whether
any impairments must derive from a mental illness, severe or otherwise.
This section examines standards most clearly endorsing consideration of a
defendant’s communicative abilities before discussing standards that are
more nebulous.
Wisconsin’s representational competence standard explicitly calls for
consideration of a broad range of communicative factors. In 1980, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court proclaimed in Pickens v. State62: “Surely a
defendant who, while mentally competent to be tried, is simply incapable of
effective communication or, because of less than average intellectual
powers, is unable to attain the minimal understanding necessary to present a
defense, is not to be allowed ‘to go to jail under his own banner.’”63 A
determination of representational competence requires an evaluation of a
person’s ability to provide “‘meaningful’ self-representation,” which
includes “the practical ability to make arguments, present evidence, and ask
effective questions.”64 Accordingly, trial courts should consider the

60. For instance, Texas has formally adopted the vague language in Edwards as its
representational competence standard, but its case law demonstrates that the quality and
content of defendants’ communications often dominate courts’ analysis. See In re J.G., 0413-00825-CV, 2014 WL 4627599, at *3–4 (Tex. App. Sept. 17, 2014) (upholding the denial
of the defendant’s request to represent himself on the basis of his behavior at trial, including
his attempts “to raise objections and question witnesses” and his “rambling monologues, ad
hominem attacks, and unregulated outbursts”); Chadwick v. State, 309 S.W.3d 558, 561–62
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (affirming that a defendant’s mental illness was severe enough to
render him incompetent to proceed pro se where the defendant “interrupted his attorney
several times[,] . . . objected several times, even as the judge granted the motions filed by his
attorney,” cursed the judge, “engaged in a rambling monologue in which he launched
personal attacks on the prosecutor, the judge, the bailiffs, judges from prior cases, and his
attorney,” and filed “several incoherent pro se written motions”).
61. See supra note 35 (outlining important parameters of this analysis).
62. 292 N.W.2d 601 (Wis. 1980).
63. Id. at 611 (quoting United States v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965)); accord
State v. Imani, 786 N.W.2d 40, 49, 53 (Wis. 2010).
64. In re Termination of Parental Rights to Sophia S., 715 N.W.2d 692, 699 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2006) (citing State v. Marquardt, 705 N.W.2d 878 (La. 2005)); see also State v.
Klessig, 564 N.W.2d 716 (Wis. 1997); Pickens, 292 N.W.2d 601. Although In re
Termination of Parental Rights to Sophia S. was not a criminal case, the court held
applicable the representational competency standards developed in the line of criminal cases
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defendant’s level of education, degree of literacy, fluency in English, and
“any physical or psychological disability which may significantly affect his
ability to communicate a possible defense to the jury.”65 A Wisconsin court
recently held this standard constitutional and consistent with Edwards.66
In Wisconsin, a finding of representational incompetence need not
depend on a finding of mental illness, severe or not.67 One man was found
incompetent to proceed pro se where he possessed a tenth-grade education,
asserted (without more) that he read at a college level, and had merely an
“observational” experience with the criminal court system.68 In a case
involving a defendant with no discernable cognitive or expressive
impairments, a Wisconsin court affirmed a finding of representational
incompetence on grounds that the defendant—who failed to provide the
trial court with drafts of specific trial documents—“did not demonstrate any
ability to prepare,” lacked an understanding of certain trial procedure, and
failed to demonstrate a readiness to argue two pending motions.69
Wisconsin courts have also applied this representational competence
standard to withhold self-representation from defendants with serious
neurological or mental health issues.70
In contrast to Wisconsin’s detailed “effective communication” standard,
Alaska, Indiana, Connecticut, and Iowa have adopted “coherent”

beginning with Pickens. See In re Termination of Parental Rights to Sophia S., 715 N.W.2d
at 696.
65. Pickens, 292 N.W.2d at 611; see also Imani, 786 N.W.2d at 53–54; In re
Termination of Parental Rights to Sophia S., 715 N.W.2d at 699 (“Collectively, published
cases have identified the following self-representation competency considerations:
education, literacy, fluency in English, the ability to communicate effectively, the
complexity of the case, the ability to put the other side to its burden of proof, the ability to
understand what is necessary to present a defense, experience in the legal system, a person’s
actual handling of the case, whether the person is unruly or unmanageable, physical
disabilities, psychological disabilities, mental illness, and the opinion of medical and
psychological experts regarding self-representation competency if the opinions identify
relevant and specific problems. This listing is not exclusive; courts may consider other
factors if they have an effect on meaningful self-representation.” (citations omitted)).
66. See State v. Jackson, 867 N.W.2d 814, 822 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015).
67. See Pickens, 292 N.W.2d at 611 (“Other disabilities, besides mental diseases and
defects of the type that render one incompetent to stand trial, may likewise make meaningful
self-representation impossible.”); accord Imani, 786 N.W.2d at 53; see also Jackson, 867
N.W.2d at 822 (“Nothing in Edwards establishes severe mental illness as the only
circumstance in which a trial judge may deny the right of self-representation. The Supreme
Court in Edwards declined to adopt a federal constitutional competency standard and
specifically recognized an individual trial court’s authority to make competency
determinations.”).
68. Imani, 786 N.W.2d at 54.
69. Jackson, 867 N.W.2d at 818, 824.
70. See State v. Dehler, Nos. 2009AP1500-CR, 2009AP1501-CR, 2010 WL 3119778, at
*4 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2010) (denying self-representation based on the defendant’s
seizure disorder, tendency to fixate on subjects or topics regardless of their actual
significance, deficits in attention, concentration, working memory, judgment and planning,
and poor coping, problem-solving, and stress management skills); State v. Marquardt, 705
N.W.2d 878, 892–93 (Wis. 2005) (denying the pro se right on the basis of the defendant’s
“microscopic review” of things, inability to detach, and delusional disorder of paranoid
schizophrenia, which interfered with his ability to plan a realistic defense strategy).
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communication standards.71 These standards are simple but potentially
capacious. Under the rubric of coherent communication, courts in these
states could theoretically consider all of the communicative factors
endorsed in Wisconsin. Alternatively, the courts could reduce their gaze to
communication that reveals disordered (or incoherent) thought.
Apprehending the full scope of these standards awaits further development
in the case law.
Alaska’s representational competence standard predates Edwards and
was inspired by a desire to prevent unjust verdicts.72 In McCracken v.
State,73 the Alaska Supreme Court stated, “In order to prevent a perversion
of the judicial process, the trial judge should first ascertain whether a
prisoner is capable of presenting his allegations in a rational and coherent
manner before allowing him to proceed pro se.”74 Interpreting this standard
in light of Edwards, an appellate court explained that “the question is
whether the defendant is capable of presenting his or her case in an
understandable way,” not “whether the defendant . . . is capable of
distinguishing a good defense from a poor one.”75 Like Wisconsin, Alaska
does not construe Edwards as requiring “serious mental illness” as a
necessary condition to representational incompetence.76 One Alaskan court
denied self-representation when an individual with a personality disorder
submitted “irrational pleadings and objections” and exhibited “obstreperous
courtroom conduct.”77 Another reversed a trial court’s grant of a
defendant’s pro se request with the explanation that “defendants who suffer
from paranoid delusions which clearly affect their ability to perceive the
evidence against them are not in a position to represent themselves,” as they
are clearly unable to present a rational and coherent defense.78
Indiana also considers the coherence of a defendant’s communications in
assessing representational competence but will deny self-representation

71. See McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d 85, 91 (Alaska 1974) (“In order to prevent a
perversion of the judicial process, the trial judge should first ascertain whether a prisoner is
capable of presenting his allegations in a rational and coherent manner before allowing him
to proceed pro se.”); State v. Connor, 973 A.2d 627, 657 (Conn. 2009) (instructing that the
representational competence inquiry should include assessment of the defendant’s “ability to
communicate coherently with the court and the jury”); Edwards v. State, 902 N.E.2d 821,
829 (Ind. 2009) (“[I]f a defendant is so impaired that a coherent presentation of a defense is
unlikely, fairness demands that the court insist upon representation.”); State v. Jason, 779
N.W.2d 66, 76 n.2 (Iowa App. 2009) (indicating that the trial court should assess the
defendant’s “ability to communicate coherently with the court and the jury” when deciding
whether to recognize his right to proceed pro se (quoting Connor, 973 A.2d at 657)).
72. See McCracken, 518 P.2d at 91–92.
73. 518 P.2d 85 (Alaska 1974).
74. Id. at 91; accord Else v. State, 555 P.2d 1210, 1211–12 (Alaska 1976).
75. Falcone v. State, 227 P.3d 469, 474 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010). The court cautioned
that “many defendants will be capable of presenting a coherent case even though, from a
legal standpoint, their asserted defense is dubious or even plainly wrong.” Id.
76. Id. at 473 (“We do not read the Edwards decision to require ‘serious mental illness’
as a necessary condition before a trial judge can limit the right of self-representation.”).
77. Id. at 470.
78. Adams v. State, 829 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
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only when impairments originate from a severe mental illness.79 In
Edwards v. State,80 on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Indiana
Supreme Court declared that, “if a defendant is so impaired that a coherent
presentation of a defense is unlikely, fairness demands that the court insist
upon representation.”81 There, the court affirmed the finding that the
defendant’s severe mental illness rendered him incompetent to conduct trial
proceedings by citing, among other things, his “rambling” and
“voluminous” writings, which demonstrated an inability to remain focused
and a disorganized thought process.82 Following Edwards, other courts
have found defendants with severe mental illnesses incompetent when
evidence of delusional, psychotic, and disordered thinking similarly
demonstrates that they “cannot communicate coherently with the Court.”83
In Connecticut, the state supreme court exercised its supervisory
authority to hold that, “upon a finding that a mentally ill or mentally
incapacitated defendant is competent to stand trial and to waive his right to
counsel at trial, the trial court must [determine] whether the defendant also
is competent to conduct the trial proceedings without counsel.”84 The court
emphasized:
[T]he determination of his competence or lack thereof must be predicated
solely on his ability to “carry out the basic tasks needed to present his
own defense without the help of counsel”; notwithstanding any mental
incapacity or impairment serious enough to call that ability into question.
Of course, in making this determination, the trial court should consider
the manner in which the defendant conducted the trial proceedings and
whether he grasped the issues pertinent to those proceedings, along with
his ability to communicate coherently with the court and the jury.85

The court urged trial courts to “consider all pertinent factors in determining
whether the defendant has sufficient mental capacity to discharge the
essential functions necessary to conduct his own defense, including the
defendant’s ability to relate to the court or the jury in a coherent manner.”86
This instruction, and the state supreme court’s repeated focus on “mental
incapacities” as the relevant body of deficiencies, implies that the court

79. The Indiana Supreme Court considered adopting a standard that would allow trial
courts to “deny a criminal defendant the right to represent himself at trial where the
defendant cannot communicate coherently with the court or jury” without a severe mental
illness limitation. See Edwards v. State, 902 N.E.2d 821, 829 (Ind. 2009), remanded from
554 U.S. 164 (2008). The court rejected the standard on Supremacy Clause grounds,
however, as it feared the proposed standard would unduly restrict the federal right to selfrepresentation. Id.
80. 902 N.E.2d 821 (Ind. 2009).
81. Id. at 829.
82. Id. at 826–27.
83. Valdez v. State, No. 18A05-1407-CR-304, 2015 WL 302272, at *2, *9–11 (Ind. Ct.
App. Jan. 22, 2015). The trial court also cited a lack of familiarity with rules of evidence,
voir dire, and a “lack of trial skills” in support of its conclusion that the defendant’s “lack of
capacity threatens an improper conviction or sentence.” Id. at *3.
84. State v. Connor, 973 A.2d 627, 650–51 (Conn. 2009) (internal citations omitted).
85. Id. at 657.
86. Id. at 657 n.32.
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would restrict cognizable communication impairments to those associated
with cognitive incapacities.87 To date, Connecticut has indicated that
findings of representational incompetence can rest on impairments “due to
mental illness or other mental incapacity,” suggesting that a predicate of
severe mental illness, and perhaps even mental illness, is unnecessary.88
Iowa courts apply a similar standard but restrict cognizable
communication difficulties to those stemming from a severe mental
illness.89 Motivated by a desire to ensure a fair trial,90 the Iowa Court of
Appeals in State v. Jason91 endorsed Connecticut’s standard of
representational competence outlined in State v. Connor.92 In Jason, the
appellate court remanded for reconsideration a trial court’s decision to
allow a defendant with Asperger’s syndrome to proceed pro se. The court
read Edwards as requiring a predicate of “severe mental illness”93 and
observed that psychological and psychiatric experts had disagreed over
whether Asperger’s syndrome could produce cognitive impairment.94 The
court found that the defendant in that case “may be a ‘gray-area’ defendant
who was competent to stand trial, but not competent to take on the
expanded role of representing himself at trial.”95 In so doing, the court
appeared willing to accept a broad conception of “severe mental illness” as
perhaps including any long-standing or chronic disorder that produces
abnormal “cognitive, perceptual, [or] affective responses.”96 The court’s
potentially broad reading of severe mental illness was confirmed in State v.
McCullah,97 where the court mused that anxiety, attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder, and antisocial personality disorder may also
constitute severe mental illnesses that could compromise an individual’s
ability to represent himself.98 The court later affirmed a trial court’s
determination that antisocial personality disorder did not constitute a
cognizable severe mental illness under Edwards.99
In guidance less direct than in the preceding four states, the California
Supreme Court has suggested that coherent communication may be relevant

87. See id.
88. See id. at 633 (emphasis added); see also id. at 655.
89. See State v. Jason, 779 N.W.2d 66, 74 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Connor, 973
A.2d at 655 ).
90. Id. at 75.
91. 779 N.W.2d 66 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009).
92. 973 A.2d 627 (Conn. 2009); see Jason, 779 N.W.2d at 76 n.2 (quoting Connor, 973
A.2d at 656).
93. See Jason, 779 N.W.2d at 75 (framing the issue as “whether Asperger’s syndrome is
a ‘severe mental illness,’ which necessarily hampers a defendant’s self-representation
right”).
94. See id. (comparing testimony of Dr. Gersh with that of Dr. Olsen).
95. Id. at 75–76.
96. Id. at 75 (quoting Dr. Olsen).
97. No. 08-0403, 2010 WL 5394747 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2010).
98. Id. at *10.
99. See State v. McCullah, No. 12-0081, 2013 WL 530943, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb.
13, 2013) (“We agree with the district court that an ‘inflated conception of his own trial
skills does not mean [McCullah] was suffering from a severe mental illness.’”).
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to a defendant’s ability to represent himself at trial.100 Until 1996,
California courts required that pro se defendants have the capacity to use
information rationally and to communicate in a coherent manner.101 In
People v. Burnett,102 an appellate court held that “competence to waive
counsel . . . includes an array of basic cognitive and communicative skills
relating to the presentation of a defense to criminal charges,”103 including
an ability to “coherently communicate [a response to the charges] to the
trier of fact.”104 California courts abrogated this standard in light of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Godinez v. Moran,105 which held that
federal law does not necessitate a higher standard of competence for
waiving counsel or pleading guilty than is required to stand trial.106
After the Edwards decision, the California Supreme Court at least
partially revived the Burnett standard and its coherent communication
component. In People v. Johnson,107 the state supreme court recognized
that Edwards characterized representational competence “as the ability ‘to
carry out the basic tasks needed to present [one’s] own defense without the
help of counsel’” and permitted states to “deny self-representation to those
competent to stand trial but who ‘suffer from severe mental illness to the
point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by
The court adopted Edwards’s characterization of
themselves.’”108
capacities necessary for representational competence and opted not to
articulate a more precise standard.109 However, the court provided
additional guidance by suggesting that trial courts and experts asked to
examine defendants’ representational competence consider the competency
standard previously articulated in Burnett, as well as the standards proposed
in two law review articles.110 The court favorably quoted this language
relevant to communication from an article by Jason Marks:
A criminal defendant is mentally incompetent to represent himself or
herself at trial if and only if a mental disorder or disability would prevent
the defendant from . . . communicating with the witnesses, the court, the

100. See People v. Johnson, 267 P.3d 1125, 1132 (Cal. 2012).
101. See People v. Hightower, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 40, 43 (Cal. App. 1996).
102. 234 Cal. Rptr. 67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
103. Id. at 76.
104. Id.; see also id. at 74 (“It is demeaning to such a person and makes a mockery of
justice for trial judges to countenance the charade that would inevitably arise in some cases
if competence to waive counsel were not deemed to include the ability to at least rationally
conceive and coherently present a bare bones defense.”).
105. 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
106. See Hightower, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 43; see also Godinez, 509 U.S. 389.
107. 267 P.3d 1125 (Cal. 2012).
108. Id. at 1132 (quoting Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 175–76 (2008)).
109. Id. (“[P]ending further guidance from the high court, we believe the standard that
trial courts considering exercising their discretion to deny self-representation should apply is
simply whether the defendant suffers from a severe mental illness to the point where he or
she cannot carry out the basic tasks needed to present the defense without the help of
counsel.”).
110. See id. (suggesting that Burnett and two law review articles “are helpful to the extent
they suggest relevant factors to consider”).
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prosecutor, and the jury in a manner calculated to implement those
strategies and tactics in at least a rudimentary manner.111

The court also favorably quoted the standard proposed by this author, which
includes an ability to “communicate decisions to a functionary of the
court.”112
Following this pronouncement, California appellate courts have affirmed
the denial of multiple defendants’ pro se motions at least partially on the
basis of communication difficulties. For example, in People v. Gardner,113
an appellate court quoted at length the opinion of a forensic psychiatrist in
finding a defendant with expressive language disorder incompetent to
represent himself.114 The doctor observed that, although the defendant did
“not have any thought process impairments or psychotic symptoms that
would prevent him from engaging rationally with an attorney” and
“demonstrated the ability to engage in strategizing and future-planning,”115
he “was impaired in his ability to string [legal terms] together articulately in
an effective and articulate presentation” and “struggled with expressing
himself” without the doctor’s clarifications.116 The doctor therefore
found—and the appellate court affirmed—that the defendant’s expressive
disorder was such that he would “not be able to communicate with the
[c]ourt or a jury with sufficient clarity to make himself understood in real
time during trial.”117 Other courts have highlighted rambling and
nonsensical filings as illustrating a defendant’s disordered thought
process.118 California courts have also factored a defendant’s thick foreign
accent and misuse of the English language into his competence to represent
himself, at least when such defendants also suffer from mental illness.119
Finally, a Wyoming statute provides that “[n]o person shall be tried,
sentenced or punished for the commission of an offense while, as a result of
mental illness or deficiency, he lacks the capacity, to . . . [c]onduct his
defense in a rational manner.”120 This requirement is part of the state’s
competence to stand trial standard and was enacted to protect defendants’
due process rights.121 When evaluating an individual’s ability to conduct a

111. Id. at 1131–32 (quoting Marks, supra note 4, at 847).
112. Id. at 1132 (quoting Johnston, supra note 4, at 595).
113. 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 528 (Ct. App. 2014).
114. See id. at 535.
115. Id. at 534.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 535 (“Communication in court requires that decisions be made quickly and
sometimes under pressure. Decisions facing defendants representing themselves include all
the basic strategic and tactical choices of trial, such as what motions to make, what witnesses
to call, and what arguments to make to the jury. [Defendant] clearly lacks the ability to
communicate clearly.”).
118. See People v. Johnson, 267 P.3d 1125, 1134 n.2 (Cal. 2012).
119. See People v. Mosley, No. B237690, 2014 WL 280345, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 27,
2014).
120. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-302 (West 2013). To date, no cases have applied this
language in the context of self-representation.
121. See Fletcher v. State, 245 P.3d 327, 331–32 (Wyo. 2010).
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defense in a rational manner, courts consider any communication
disabilities, such as those stemming from an expressive disorder.122
Crucially, the standards outlined above diverge in whether they apply
only to defendants with a mental illness and in whether that mental illness
must be severe. Alaska and Wisconsin do not require any finding of mental
illness (severe or otherwise) for a determination of incompetence to proceed
pro se.123 The standards in Connecticut and Wyoming, on the other hand,
appear applicable to defendants with a mental illness of any severity.124
Finally, Iowa, Indiana, and California restrict representational competence
requirements to defendants with a “severe” mental illness.125
D. Taxonomy of Communication Difficulties
The seven state standards with communication components and the cases
in which they have been applied suggest the existence of at least four
categories of communication impairments, each of possibly differing
constitutional significance: disordered speech, inability to be understood by
courtroom actors, inability to communicate in a timely manner, and
suboptimal advocacy. These categories differ in the degree to which they
reflect or necessarily coexist with mental illness or cognitive impairment
and whether they are susceptible to amelioration by standby (or hybrid)126
counsel. Thus, these categories of impairments vary in the extent to which
they implicate a defendant’s autonomy, as well as the fairness or accuracy
of an adjudication. Disaggregating and separately exploring these types of
impairments allows the discernment of precisely when, and on what basis, a

122. See id. at 333 (taking note of the defendant’s possible expressive and receptive
language dysfunction as part of the competency to stand trial inquiry).
123. See supra notes 67, 76.
124. See State v. Connor, 973 A.2d 627, 650 (Conn. 2009) (adopting “for mentally ill or
mentally incapacitated defendants who wish to represent themselves at trial a competency
standard that differs from the standard for determining whether such a defendant is
competent to stand trial”); see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-302.
125. See People v. Johnson, 267 P.3d 1125, 1132 (Cal. 2012); Edwards v. State, 902
N.E.2d 821, 824 (Ind. 2009); State v. Jason, 779 N.W.2d 66, 75 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009).
126. Judge Colquitt has explained the difference between hybrid and standby counsel in
this way:
[H]ybrid representation consists of concurrent self-representation and
representation by counsel. The hybrid model differs considerably from standby or
advisory counsel in that it constitutes a “co-counsel” model which involves actual
assistance of the attorney in the trial process. In the advisory-counsel model, the
attorney generally only counsels the defendant, although if the need arises the
attorney may assist in the presentation of motions or the offering of objections.
Standby or advisory counsel normally are not permitted to represent actively the
defendant, while hybrid counsel actually share in such activities as jury selection,
opening statements, examination of witnesses, and closing arguments. Pro se
defendants act as their own counsel, but may consult with the standby counsel at
reasonable times. By way of contrast, in hybrid cases, the accused and the
attorney share the role of counsel, although the defendant may well take the lead in
the case.
Colquitt, supra note 18, at 74–75.
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court may deny self-representation consistent with Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence and the normative lens developed in Part II.127
1. Disordered Speech
The first category of communication impairment involves disordered
speech. Communications of this kind may be symptomatic of several
mental illnesses, including schizophrenia,128 schizotypal personality
disorder,129 schizophreniform disorder,130 or schizoaffective disorder.131
According to the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-5), disordered thinking and speech are key features
of psychotic disorders and may present in various ways:
Disorganized thinking (formal thought disorder) is typically inferred from
the individual’s speech. The individual may switch from one topic to
another (derailment or loose associations). Answers to questions may be
obliquely related or completely unrelated (tangentiality). Rarely, speech
may be so severely disorganized that it is nearly incomprehensible and
resembles receptive aphasia in its linguistic disorganization (incoherence
or “word salad”).132

Often, individuals with a thought disorder and exhibiting disorganized
speech have serious cognitive impairments, including “decrements in
declarative memory, working memory, language function, and other
executive functions, as well as slower processing speed.”133 Given the

127. Although the focus of this article remains fixed on representational competence, it is
important to note that the impairments explored below may also affect an individual’s
competence to stand trial. Indeed, other commentators have argued that there are no grayarea defendants if competency to proceed is properly defined to include aspects of
adjudicative and decisional competence. See Slobogin, supra note 4, at 405–06. For
purposes of this Article, however, I (like the Court in Edwards) assume the existence of
gray-area defendants who are competent to stand trial but may be incompetent to represent
themselves at trial. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
128. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 99–100 (Emily A. Kuhl & Susan K. Schultz eds., 5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter
DSM-5] (detailing the diagnostic criteria of schizophrenia, which include disorganized
speech).
129. See id. at 655–56 (listing “odd thinking and speech (e.g., vague, circumstantial,
metaphorical, overelaborate, or stereotyped)” as a symptom of schizotypal personality
disorder); id. at 656 (“Their speech may include unusual or idiosyncratic phrasing and
construction. It is often loose, digressive, or vague, but without actual derailment or
incoherence. Responses can be either overly concrete or overly abstract, and words or
concepts are sometimes applied in unusual ways (e.g., the individual may state that he or she
was not ‘talkable’ at work).”).
130. See id. at 96–97 (manifesting in symptoms identical to schizophrenia but
distinguished by shorter total duration of illness; includes symptom of “disorganized speech
(e.g., frequent derailment or incoherence)”).
131. See id. at 105–06 (defined in part as “an uninterrupted period of illness during which
there is a major mood episode (major depressive or manic) concurrent with Criterion A of
schizophrenia”).
132. Id. at 88.
133. Id. at 101–02 (referring to schizophrenia and stating that “[i]mpaired cognition is
common, and alterations in cognition are present during development and precede the
emergence of psychosis, taking the form of stable cognitive impairments during adulthood.
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established relationship between disorganized speech and thought disorders,
disorganized speech may be a strong indicator of cognitive impairment and,
possibly, an impaired means of recognizing and advancing one’s best
interests. Accordingly, a number of courts have denied self-representation
to defendants exhibiting disordered speech.134
2. Inability to Be Understood by Courtroom Actors
A second category of communication impairment prevents a defendant
from being understood by courtroom actors. Because the defendant’s
competency to stand trial is not at issue,135 he will necessarily be able to
communicate adequately with counsel in written or oral form, perhaps with
the assistance of a translator.136 A pro se defendant, however, must interact
effectively with a judge, opposing counsel, and potentially witnesses. A
number of impediments can interfere with a defendant’s ability to verbalize
intelligible speech to these individuals. For instance, a defendant may have
a speech impediment such a stutter or lisp,137 a tic disorder such as
Tourette’s syndrome, Parkinson’s disease, soft speech, or a thick foreign
accent.138 Impairments in this category may or may not originate from a
mental illness,139 and they often will not reflect any deficits in cognitive
abilities.140
Cognitive impairments may persist when other symptoms are in remission and contribute to
the disability of the disease”).
134. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 267 P.3d 1125, 1134 n.2 (Cal. 2012) (illustrating how
the defendant’s “delusional thought disorder” impaired his ability to represent himself by
appending a rambling, nonsensical, incoherent document consisting of unrelated sentence
fragments that had been submitted by the defendant); Edwards v. State, 902 N.E.2d 821,
824, 826–27 (Ind. 2009) (affirming the defendant’s representational incompetence by citing,
among other things, his “rambling” and “voluminous” writings, which demonstrated an
inability to remain focused and a disorganized thought process); Valdez v. State, No. 18A051407-CR-304, 2015 WL 302272, at *3–4, *9–11 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2015) (upholding a
finding of representational incompetence where the trial court provided numerous examples
of delusional, psychotic, and disordered thinking as evidence that the defendant, diagnosed
with paranoid schizophrenia, “cannot communicate coherently with the Court”). All seven
standards with communication components—and presumably the twenty standards
embracing the vague language from Edwards—would recognize problematic
communications falling in this category. See, e.g., supra note 134 (including representative
cases from states with communication-based representational competence standards).
135. See supra note 127.
136. See supra note 26 (articulating the legal standard for competence to stand trial).
137. See Savage v. Estelle, 924 F.2d 1459, 1460 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a trial court
may deny a criminal defendant’s right to represent himself at trial where the defendant’s
severe speech impediment renders him unable to articulate his own defense).
138. See People v. Mosley, No. B237690, 2014 WL 280345, at *5–6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan.
27, 2014) (upholding a finding of representational incompetence based originally, in part, on
the defendant’s thick foreign accent and misuse of the English language); cf. Pickens v.
State, 292 N.W.2d 601, 611 (Wis. 1980) (including “fluency in English” as a factor relevant
to representational incompetence).
139. See DSM-5, supra note 128, at 44–45 (defining diagnostic criteria for speech sound
disorder, of which lisping is a particularly common variant); id. at 45–46 (defining
diagnostic criteria for childhood-onset fluency disorder, or stuttering); id. at 81–83 (defining
tic disorders).
140. See supra note 139 (including diagnostic criteria and commentary in the DSM-5).
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3. Inability to Communicate in a Timely Fashion
A third category of communication impairment involves an inability to
communicate to common courtroom actors within the bustle of trial. Trial
is stressful and requires a defendant to make decisions within a short period
of time before an impatient, potentially hostile audience.141 While a host of
cognitive, affective, and behavioral impairments can impair a defendant’s
ability to make or execute decisions in a short timeframe,142 a defendant’s
participation may be subverted by communicative problems as well. For
instance, he may have slowed speech, interpose lengthy pauses before
speaking,143 or require excessive clarification to be understood.144
Impaired expressions of this sort may coexist with cognitive dysfunction or
could reflect anxiety or deficits in social skills. Relatedly, these
impairments may, or may not, flow from a recognized mental illness, severe
or not.
4. Suboptimal Advocacy
A fourth category of communication impediments includes conditions
that do not fall into the other three categories but still impede the optimal
execution of a defense. Conditions of this type, such as low educational
attainment, lack of reading fluency, or lack of familiarity with criminal law
or procedure, could affect the substance of a defendant’s strategic choices
and communications.145 Alternatively, relevant conditions, such as a
tendency to ramble, interrupt, or ask repetitive questions of a witness, could
undermine the effectiveness of the defendant’s execution of his chosen
strategies or tactics.146 Conditions in this camp relate to the effectiveness
of a defendant’s defense and performance at trial. These conditions may or
may not relate to a defendant’s mental illness.

141. See Johnston, supra note 4, at 585–86.
142. For example, a defendant may lack the ability to sustain mental organization,
maintain concentration or attention, make decisions within a short timeframe, process new
information and adapt positions accordingly, or withstand the stress likely to accompany trial
participation. The Edwards Court alluded to some of these elements. See Edwards, 128 S.
Ct. at 2387 (citing Brief for Am. Psychiatric Ass’n et al., supra note 32, at 26).
143. See DSM-5, supra note 128, at 163 (detailing psychomotor changes associated with
major depressive disorder).
144. See People v. Gardner, 480 Cal. Rptr. 3d 528, 535–36 (Ct. App. 2014).
145. See State v. Imani, 786 N.W.2d 40, 54 (Wis. 2010) (finding a defendant incompetent
to proceed pro se where he possessed a tenth-grade education, asserted without more that he
read at a college level, and had merely an “observational” experience with the criminal court
system); Pickens v. State, 292 N.W.2d 601, 611 (Wis. 1980); State v. Jackson, 867 N.W.2d
814, 824 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015) (affirming a finding of representational incompetence on the
grounds that the defendant “did not demonstrate any ability to prepare” for trial, lacked an
understanding of certain trial procedure, and failed to demonstrate a readiness to argue two
pending motions).
146. See In re J.G., Nos. 04-13-00825-CV, 04-13-00827-CV, 2014 WL 4627599, at *3–4
(Tex. App. Sept. 17, 2014); Chadwick v. State, 309 S.W.3d 558, 562 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010).
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The categories outlined above are necessarily rough, incomplete, and
may overlap in places. They provide useful fodder, however, with which to
examine when, and under which conditions, a state may deny selfrepresentation to a defendant on the basis of a communication problem
consistent with the Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause.
II. RELATIONSHIP OF COMMUNICATION
TO REPRESENTATIONAL COMPETENCE
Neither courts nor commentators have scrutinized the extent to which
various kinds of communication impairments could, or should, serve as
grounds for representational incompetence. To answer this complicated
question, it is necessary to articulate and defend a normative theory of
representational competence and to examine the confines of the Sixth
Amendment right to self-representation. On both scores, close examination
of relevant U.S. Supreme Court precedent is critical.
A. Normative Conception of Representational Competence
Competence is ultimately a legal and moral judgment, not an objective,
clinically measurable reality.147 Therefore, normative considerations must
guide the selection and rejection of abilities for inclusion in a
Self-representation by a
representational competence standard.148
marginally competent defendant recognizes and promotes the autonomy of
the defendant while potentially impairing the reliability of the adjudication,
the actual and apparent fairness of the proceeding, and the perceived
A representational
legitimacy of the criminal justice process.149
competence standard should reflect a proper balancing of these values and
interests. To the extent a criterion is unnecessary to achieve these
interests—and its inclusion would result in withholding a valued right on
unjustifiable grounds—that element should be removed from the
competency standard. Analysis of Faretta v. California, McKaskle v.
Wiggins,150 and Indiana v. Edwards reveals that autonomy remains the
predominant value in representational competence, while accuracy and
fairness assume positions of lesser importance.

147. See Bonnie, supra note 52, at 540 n.1; see also id. at 601 (“Whether a defendant fails
to ‘appreciate’ the nature and consequences of the decision or lacks the capacity to make a
‘reasoned choice’ is, of course, not a clinical ‘fact,’ but rather a thick value judgment
anchored in intuitions about individual autonomy and social obligation.”).
148. See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A
Theoretical Reformulation, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 291, 298 (1992); Bruce J. Winick, The Side
Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the Implications for Mental Health Law, 1 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 6, 31 (1995).
149. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176–77 (2008).
150. 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
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1. Predominance of Autonomy
Autonomy animates the right to self-representation.151 In Faretta, the
Supreme Court derived the right to self-representation from our nation’s
history,152 the text of the Sixth Amendment,153 and “that respect for the
individual which is the lifeblood of the law.”154 The Faretta Court stressed
the importance of three aspects of autonomy. First, the Court emphasized
“the inestimable worth of free choice.”155 Allowing a defendant to control
his defense honors the dignity and individualism of the defendant.156 The
Court opined:
To deny an accused a choice of procedure in circumstances in which he,
though a layman, is as capable as any lawyer of making an intelligent
choice, is to impair the worth of great Constitutional safeguards by
treating them as empty verbalisms . . . [and] to imprison a man in his
privileges and call it the Constitution.157

Because a defendant will suffer the consequences of a conviction, he must
be free to decide whether representation is to his advantage.158 This choice,
while often misguided,159 must be honored out of esteem for the individual
and respect for his inherent right of self-determination.160 This principle,
which the Court linked to the Founders’ conception of natural law,161
manifests in “a nearly universal conviction . . . that forcing a lawyer upon
an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he
truly wants to do so.”162
Second, Faretta recognized that allowing a defendant to control his
defense is critical to “the substance of an accused’s position before the
151. See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178 (“[T]he right to appear pro se exists to affirm the
accused’s individual dignity and autonomy.”); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834; Bribiesca v. Galaza,
215 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2000) (“At its heart, the rule expounded by the Supreme Court
in Faretta is a rule protecting individual autonomy.”).
152. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 812–17, 826–32.
153. Id. at 818–26.
154. Id. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350–51 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
155. Id.
156. See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 176–77 (“The right to appear pro se exists to affirm the
dignity and autonomy of the accused and to allow the presentation of what may, at least
occasionally, be the accused’s best possible defense. . . . In determining whether a
defendant’s Faretta rights have been respected, the primary focus must be on whether the
defendant had a fair chance to present his case in his own way.”).
157. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 815 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel., 317 U.S. 269, 279–
80 (1942)).
158. Id. at 819, 834.
159. See id. at 832–33 & n.43. But see Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of SelfRepresentation: An Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423,
427–28, 447 (2007) (finding that pro se defendants are convicted at rates equal to or lower
than their represented counterparts).
160. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834.
161. Id. at 830 n.39 (“The Founders believed that self-representation was a basic right of
a free people. Underlying this belief was not only the anti-lawyer sentiment of the populace,
but also the ‘natural law’ thinking that characterized the Revolution’s spokesmen.”).
162. Id. at 817.
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law.”163 In essence, the Court recognized a defendant’s ability to respond
to the prosecution on his own terms, in his own way.164 The Court rejected
the coercive power of the government to haul a person into court, force a
government-selected and government-funded lawyer upon him, and
authorize that lawyer to override the strategic positions of the defendant.165
Indeed, self-representation is the means of last resort for a defendant
wanting to make strategic decisions with which his attorney disagrees.
When a defendant is represented, his counsel holds the authority to make
binding decisions of strategy and tactics.166 In cases recognizing this
authority, courts stress that, if a defendant is determined to proceed in a
manner contrary to that preferred by his attorney, he can always release his
attorney and proceed pro se.167 A pro se defendant, on the other hand, has
no other options. If a court rejects his motion to represent himself, the
defendant has no recourse and must relinquish control over his preferred
means of defense.168
Third, effectuating a defendant’s rejection of counsel is a necessary
correlate of the agency relationship that binds client to counsel.169 Familiar

163. Id. at 815 (quoting Adams, 317 U.S. at 279). In McKaskle, the Supreme Court
elaborated upon the defendant’s right to control his defense. See infra notes 218–21.
164. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 815; see also id. at 818 (“The Sixth Amendment does not
provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused
personally the right to make his defense.”); id. at 819–20 (“Although not stated in the
Amendment in so many words, the right to self-representation—to make one’s own defense
personally—is thus necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment. The right to
defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the
defense fails.”); id. at 821 (“An unwanted counsel ‘represents’ the defendant only through a
tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such
representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution,
for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense.”); id. at 834 (“The right to defend is personal.
The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a
conviction.”).
165. See id. at 807, 820, 833, 834.
166. See Gonzales v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 248 (2008). Under current case law, a
defendant can control the strategy and tactics of his case only when he forgoes assistance of
counsel. See id.; Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). Otherwise, counsel has the
authority to select, over a defendant’s objection, which witnesses to call, which witnesses to
cross-examine, what evidence to admit, and to make other tactical decisions, including
possibly which defense to exert. See Gonzales, 553 U.S. at 248. Ethical rules do not provide
clear guidance on whether a lawyer should follow his client’s directives regarding strategy.
See Martin Sabelli & Stacey Leyton, Train Wrecks and Freeway Crashes: An Argument for
Fairness and Against Self Representation in the Criminal Justice System, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 161, 182–85 (2000).
167. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 751 (explaining that a defendant only has authority to make
“certain fundamental decisions,” and suggesting that, if he wants additional control, he could
“elect to act as his or her own advocate”).
168. However, even a represented defendant retains control over remaining silent or
testifying. In addition, many courts have recognized a defendant’s right to decide whether to
raise an insanity defense. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE 211–12 (2006).
169. See James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization “Officer
of the Court”, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349, 399 (2000) (“The attorney-client relationship is created
in the same way as all agency relations, by agreement.”); Grace M. Giesel, Client
Responsibility for Lawyer Conduct: Examining the Agency Nature of the Lawyer-Client
Relationship, 86 NEB. L. REV. 346, 352 (2007) (“Attorneys generally have been viewed as
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black letter law holds that an agent cannot bind the principal unless the
principal implicitly or explicitly has consented to the contours of the
representation.170 Within this paradigm, the defendant is the principal, and
his attorney (his agent) only serves with his assent. The Faretta Court
declared that counsel “shall be an aid to a willing defendant—not an organ
of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to
defend himself personally.”171 Otherwise, “counsel is not an assistant, but a
master.”172 In this vein, the Court explained the traditional allocation of
most trial decisions to counsel as premised on “the defendant’s consent, at
the outset, to accept counsel as his representative.”173 By definition, if a
defendant withholds consent, then his attorney lacks the authority to speak
for him, and the defendant should not be bound by the attorney’s strategic
and tactical choices.174
Respecting the autonomy of an individual is especially crucial within the
context of a criminal trial where the stakes are high, the proceedings are
public, and decisions are likely to be of great personal value.175 A criminal
trial may be the most important event in a person’s life. The outcome of a
criminal trial holds profound consequences for the defendant, potentially
affecting his liberty, personal relationships, status in the community, current
and future employment prospects, and personal identity. Critically, a
defendant—particularly, perhaps, one who is likely to exercise his right to
self-representation—may have goals besides that of securing an acquittal or
the lightest sentence possible.176 The defendant may wish to assert a
independent contractor agents. Clients do not control the physical actions of attorneys, but
they do authorize attorneys to act for them. Thus, attorneys are not servants, but agents.”); cf.
Robert J. Condlin, “What’s Love Got To Do With It?”—“It’s Not Like They’re Your Friends
for Christ’s Sake”: The Complicated Relationship Between Lawyer and Client, 82 NEB. L.
REV. 211, 306–11 (2003) (arguing that lawyers are most properly conceptualized as a
“friendly” fiduciary or agent); Adam Liptak, Foreword: Agency and Equity: Why Do We
Blame Clients for Their Lawyers’ Mistakes?, 110 MICH. L. REV. 875 (2012) (arguing that
clients and lawyers fit the agency model imperfectly).
170. See 3 AM. JUR. 2d Agency § 14 (2016); see also id. § 15 (discussing express or
implied agency).
171. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820.
172. Id.; see also id. at 821 (“An unwanted counsel ‘represents’ the defendant only
through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such
representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution,
for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense.”).
173. Id. at 820–21.
174. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 188 (2008) (Scalia, J. dissenting); Gonzales
v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 254 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that “action taken
by counsel over his client’s objection . . . would have the effect of revoking the agency with
respect to the action in question”); cf. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633–34
(1962) (“Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he
cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent.
Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation,
in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to
have notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.”).
175. See Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The
Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315, 337 (1987).
176. See Douglas Mossman & Neal W. Dunseith, Jr., “A Fool for a Client”: Print
Portrayals of 49 Pro Se Criminal Defendants, 29 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 408, 414
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particular right, even when his attorney believes the legal argument has
little merit.177 He may prefer a guilty verdict to the stigma of being labeled
insane.178 He may want to use his “day in court” to express a certain
political view.179 He may opt for a term of imprisonment over implicating
friends or family, endangering important personal relationships,
jeopardizing his status in the community, or violating his personal moral
code.180 Attorneys assigned to represent defendants with such preferences
may reject their clients’ wishes as contrary to their best interests.181 But,
“[a]s John Stuart Mill has observed, the individual is the one most
interested in his well-being and is the most knowledgeable about his
feelings, values, priorities, and circumstances.”182
2. Importance of Accuracy and Fairness
While the interest of autonomy is paramount to self-representation, the
U.S. Supreme Court in Edwards recognized that competing values may
warrant overriding a defendant’s decision to proceed without counsel even
(2001) (characterizing defendants’ reasons for wanting to represent themselves as eccentric,
ideological, and personal); infra note 179.
177. See Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73, 81 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding that an attorney
may waive the client’s right to assert a defense based on the Fourth Amendment over his
objection).
178. See Anne C. Singer, The Imposition of the Insanity Defense on an Unwilling
Defendant, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 637, 637–39, 637 n.2 (1980) (listing the “onerous
consequences” that may attend a successful insanity defense); Sabelli & Leyton, supra note
166, at 192–93.
179. See United States v. Robertson, 430 F. Supp. 444, 447 (D.D.C. 1977) (quoting the
defendant as rejecting an insanity defense “for personal reasons of a quasi-political nature”);
Hashimoto, supra note 159, at 473–75 (revealing that pro se defendants may be more likely
to be charged with crimes that lend themselves to ideological defenses and to exert such
defenses); Mossman & Dunseith, supra note 176, at 414 (describing defendants whose selfrepresentation reflected larger ideological issues); Phillip J. Resnick, The Political Offender:
Forensic Psychiatric Considerations, 6 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 388, 391 (1978).
180. See David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 454,
455–57, 457 n.3 (describing cases in which defendants prioritized the maintenance of
relationships or consistency with their “personal code of honor” over acquittal or large
settlements).
181. See id. at 487–88 & n.79 (observing that “[a]ttorneys are trained in skills almost
exclusively concerned with attaining maximizing ends” such as the shortest sentence or the
largest judgment). An attorney’s inability to identify accurately his client’s values and
interests may be particularly acute when the client is mentally ill. Professor Michael Perlin
has argued that “sanism,” an irrational prejudice against the mentally ill on par with other
biases such as homophobia, pervades criminal justice jurisprudence and lawyering. See
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 21–24, 48–58
(2000).
182. See Johnston, supra note 4, at 535 (“He is the person most interested in his own
well-being: the interest which any other person, except in cases of strong personal
attachment, can have in it, is trifling, compared with that which he himself has; the interest
which society has in him individually (except as to his conduct to others) is fractional, and
altogether indirect: while with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most
ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be
possessed by any one else.” (citing JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 45 (Peoples ed. 1859),
in ON LIBERTY, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 5, 94 (Oxford
Univ. Press World’s Classics ed. 1946))).
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when he is competent to stand trial. In particular, the Court suggested that a
trial court could deny a motion for self-representation when “a defendant’s
lack of capacity threatens an improper conviction or sentence” or risks an
actual or apparently unfair trial.183 The Edwards Court did not advise how
lower courts should weigh these interests against the value of a defendant’s
autonomy.184 However, the relative weight of these values may be
discerned by the Court’s affirmance of Faretta and the relation between the
values espoused by Edwards and the questionable capacity of a gray-area
defendant with serious mental illness to exercise meaningful autonomy.185
The values endorsed in Edwards—accuracy of verdicts, propriety of
sentences, fairness of trials, and trials that appear fair to observers—are
often issues collateral to a defendant’s autonomy. The Court’s concern in
Edwards regarded the “mental capacities” of defendants who “suffer from
severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct
trial proceedings by themselves.”186 Ahmad Edwards offered a perfect test
case: he suffered from schizophrenia, a severe, chronic mental illness
characterized by delusions and sometimes disorganized communication.187
While trial courts not uncommonly find individuals with schizophrenia
competent to stand trial,188 such a defendant may lack the decisional
abilities necessary to render autonomous, self-interested choices in the
context of self-representation.189 For instance, an individual plagued by
disordered thinking may be unable to gather information to evaluate the
state’s case,190 generate alternative courses of action,191 or maintain mental
183. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176–77 (2008). In addition, the Court asserted
that allowing a borderline-competent defendant to represent himself would not be respectful
of his autonomy because the representation could result in a “humiliating” spectacle. Id. at
176. While Justice Scalia forcibly and effectively responded to the majority’s concern, id. at
186–87 (Scalia, J., dissenting), Richard Bonnie has framed the argument slightly differently
in asserting that a defendant’s incompetence jeopardizes the moral dignity of the trial
process. See Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants with Mental
Retardation to Participate in Their Own Defense, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 426–27
(1990).
184. The Court in Edwards did not analyze whether Mr. Edwards was capable of
exercising meaningful autonomy, as questions of fact are beyond the Court’s purview. The
Court did indicate its interest in a defendant’s powers of understanding, reasoning, and
appreciation, however, and linked them to his ability to “carry out the basic tasks needed to
present his own defense without the help of counsel.” See Edwards, 554 U.S. at 175–176;
see also infra notes 237–60.
185. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178 (rejecting petitioner Indiana’s request to overrule Faretta
and abstaining from criticizing the rationale of Faretta or questioning its emphasis on
autonomy).
186. Id.
187. DSM-5, supra note 128, at 87–90, 99–101.
188. See, e.g., Edwards, 554 U.S. at 169; United States v. Caraza, 843 F.2d 432 (11th Cir.
1988); United States v. Simmons, 993 F. Supp. 168 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
189. For a representational competence standard consisting largely of decisional abilities,
see Bonnie, supra note 52, at 556–57, 571–72, 579. See also Johnston, supra note 4, at 541–
92; Marks, supra note 4, at 847; Slobogin, supra note 4, at 410.
190. See Johnston, supra note 4, at 553–56 (defining and discussing the importance of
problem definition and formulation for representational competence).
191. See id. at 557–61 (discussing the importance of generating alternatives for
representational competence).
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In these situations, a defendant’s actions and
organization.192
communications at trial may not reflect a meaningful exercise of selfdetermination. To the extent that a defendant is incapable of engaging in
autonomous decision making, he does not possess a cognizable autonomy
interest.193 It is also in these situations when concerns about the
fundamental fairness of a trial and the accuracy of a verdict are most acute,
because the defendant is least likely to be capable of effectively challenging
the government’s case. The language used in Edwards to couch its
solicitousness about fairness reflects this understanding.194 This conclusion
is also buttressed by the Edwards Court’s observation that risks of an
improper conviction may be restricted to those pro se defendants of
questionable competency to stand trial.195 In such cases, concerns exist as
to the defendant’s understanding of the nature and purpose of the criminal
process, appreciation of his situation as a criminal defendant, or capacity to
recognize and relate relevant information to his attorney.196
Furthermore, Edwards, Faretta, and McKaskle indicate that concerns
about the ultimate reliability of a conviction should rarely override the
knowing and intelligent choice of a defendant to proceed pro se. Edwards
characterized as “exceptional” a denial of self-representation by a defendant
capable of effecting a valid waiver of counsel197 because of concern over an
improper conviction or sentence.198 This characterization accords with
Faretta, where the Court held that, when a defendant is capable of
meaningful autonomy,199 concern for the reliability of the verdict must give
way to honoring the defendant’s desire to control his defense.200 Thus, the

192. See id. at 585 (discussing the importance of maintaining mental organization for
representational competence).
193. See E. Lea Johnston, Setting the Standard: A Critique of Bonnie’s Competency
Standard and the Potential of Problem-Solving Theory for Self-Representation at Trial, 43
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1605, 1661–63 (2010); Christopher Slobogin & Amy Mashburn, The
Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Fiduciary Duty to Clients with Mental Disability, 68 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1581, 1586–87 (2000) (explaining the relationship between incompetence and
autonomy).
194. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177 (2008) (referencing two examples of
“insane” men who attempt to represent themselves as exemplifying the concern for fairness
and the appearance of fairness).
195. See id. at 178.
196. See Bonnie, supra note 52, at 562–63. Thus, one could argue that a court should
reevaluate competency to proceed once a mentally ill defendant indicates he wants to
proceed pro se. I appreciate this observation from Chris Slobogin.
197. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176–77, 183 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that there was “no
dispute” that Edwards effected a valid waiver of his right to counsel).
198. Id. (“Moreover, insofar as a defendant’s lack of capacity threatens an improper
conviction or sentence, self-representation in that exceptional context undercuts the most
basic of the Constitution’s criminal law objectives, providing a fair trial.”).
199. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (noting that Faretta was “literate,
competent, and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free
will”).
200. See id. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350–51 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)); see also Bonnie, supra note 52, at 558 (“Faretta holds, in effect, that autonomy
can trump reliability.”).
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value of accuracy is typically subordinate in importance to respect for a
defendant’s autonomy.201
Weighing the relative importance of the competing values at stake in
self-representation, one defensible normative conception of representational
competence is this: a court should allow a defendant capable of
autonomous decision making to control his defense unless the selfrepresentation poses a grave threat to the reliability, fairness, or integrity of
the adjudication.202
While other normative formulations may be
plausible,203 this standard reflects the clear importance of autonomy to the
pro se right, Edwards’s reassurance that Faretta and its underlying rationale
remain good law,204 and Edwards’s desire to shield certain mentally
disordered defendants from demonstrably unfair or unreliable results.205
This normative theory dictates that decisional or functional abilities should
only be required if one of two criteria is met. First, representational
competence should require those decisional capacities necessarily present
for the exercise of meaningful autonomy.206 Second, a representational
competence standard should include a functional ability if its absence poses
a grave threat to the reliability or the actual or apparent fairness of the
adjudication.
B. Supreme Court Guidance on
Communication and Self-Representation
Before applying this normative theory to communication inadequacies, it
is necessary to explore what the Supreme Court has said—or hinted—about
the importance of communication and performance to self-representation.
Such language provides crucial guidance as to the contours of the selfrepresentation right and which components of representational competence
will survive constitutional scrutiny. In essence, this examination helps to
expose the amorphous line between cognizable impairments of expression
and noncognizable (and expected) poor performance by pro se defendants at
trial. Notably, the analysis also reveals the Court’s conception of selfrepresentation as a bundle of rights, with distinct rights of control and
execution. This conceptualization potentially holds profound consequences
for the constitution of representational competence.

201. See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268 (1984) (“[T]he [Faretta] right
reflects constitutional protection of the defendant’s free choice independent of concern for
the objective fairness of the proceeding.”).
202. Johnston, supra note 193, at 1614, 1626, 1656, 1661.
203. See id. at 1660–61.
204. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178 (2008).
205. Id.
206. See Luban, supra note 180, at 465–66.
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1. Clues from Faretta
In Faretta, the defendant was competent both to control and conduct his
defense.207 Accordingly, the Court had no reason to probe the components
of representational competence. Faretta indicates, however, that, so long as
a defendant’s decision to proceed pro se is informed, his ability to conduct
his defense should be irrelevant to his representational competence.208
Faretta clearly demonstrates the importance of decision-making abilities
for an individual’s competence to proceed pro se. For instance, in noting
that the defendant was competent, the Court stressed that “he was
voluntarily exercising his informed free will.”209 This language suggests
that the competence inquiry should include whether the defendant possesses
those attributes requisite to meaningful autonomy, including the abilities to
identify his best interests and reach rational decisions that advance those
interests.210 Similarly, the Court stated that a defendant should be entitled
to a choice of procedure “in circumstances in which he, though a layman, is
as capable as any lawyer of making an intelligent choice.”211 The Court’s
requirement of a knowing and voluntary waiver also illustrates the
significance of a rational decision-making process.212
Significantly, the Faretta Court warned lower courts not to hold pro se
defendants to exacting technical or performance standards. The Court
emphasized that “a defendant need not himself have the skill and
experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose selfrepresentation”213 and that, “although he may conduct his own defense
ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored.”214
Additionally, the Court found that the defendant’s “technical legal
knowledge” was irrelevant to the pro se inquiry.215 Therefore, while the
Court did not directly address the subject of representational competence in
Faretta, its language and focus on autonomy suggest the centrality of a

207. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (“The record affirmatively shows
that Faretta was literate, competent, and understanding, and that he was voluntarily
exercising his informed free will.”).
208. See id. at 835–36.
209. Id. at 835.
210. See id.; cf. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (stressing the importance of
rational understanding to one’s competence to waive the right to counsel and to plead
guilty); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (stressing the importance of rational
understanding to one’s competence to stand trial).
211. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 815 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S.
269, 279–80 (1942)).
212. See id. at 835 (holding that, to represent oneself, one must “knowingly and
intelligently” forgo the benefits of counsel (citation omitted)); cf. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401
& n.12 (stressing that “there is a ‘heightened’ standard for . . . waiving the right to counsel,
but it is not a heightened standard of competence”).
213. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams, 317 U.S. at 279).
214. Id. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350–51 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
215. Id. at 836.
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defendant’s decision-making abilities and the immateriality of his technical
knowledge, skills, experience, and performance abilities.216
2. McKaskle: Differentiation of Control from Performance
McKaskle v. Wiggins demonstrates that trial courts should treat a
defendant’s ability to control his defense separately from his ability to
perform it. In McKaskle, the Supreme Court conceptualized selfrepresentation as a bundle of “certain specific rights to have [one’s] voice
heard.”217 The first specific right—“the core of the Faretta right”—
involves control over the organization and content of the case the defendant
chooses to present.218 Control over one’s case includes the ability to make
all significant strategic and tactical decisions for the defense, including
which defense to exert and choices concerning the questioning of
witnesses.219 Control over defense decisions is necessary to effectuate the
“primary focus” of the Faretta right, which the Court identified as allowing
a defendant “a fair chance to present his case in his own way.”220 The
Court expressly allocated the right of decisional control to the pro se
defendant.221
McKaskle also recognized that self-representation involves a right of
execution or performance. This right is more complicated because multiple
individuals may speak for the defense.222 As a general matter, the
defendant has an “affirmative right to participate”223 in his defense and “to
appear on stage at his trial.”224 The Court elaborated that a pro se
defendant “must be allowed . . . to make motions, to argue points of law, to
participate in voir dire, to question witnesses, and to address the court and
the jury at appropriate points in the trial.”225 Thus, in addition to a right of
control, the pro se defendant has broad (and perhaps unlimited) rights of
participation.

216. Indeed, numerous appellate courts since Faretta have overturned denials of selfrepresentation based on lack of technical knowledge. See, e.g., United States v. Peppers, 302
F.3d 120, 134 (3rd Cir. 2002); Vanisi v. State, 22 P.3d 1164, 1171–72 (Nev. 2001); United
States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2000).
217. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 (1984); id. at 177 (“The specific rights to
make his voice heard that Wiggins was plainly accorded . . . form the core of a defendant’s
right of self-representation.”).
218. Id. at 178 (“First, the pro se defendant is entitled to preserve actual control over the
case he chooses to present to the jury.”); id. at 174 (“The pro se defendant must be allowed
to control the organization and content of his own defense.”).
219. Id. at 178. As to any matter that would normally be left to the defense’s discretion, a
judge must resolve any dispute between a defendant and his standby counsel in the
defendant’s favor. Id. at 181.
220. Id. at 177 (“The specific rights to make his voice heard . . . form the core of a
defendant’s right of self-representation.”).
221. See id. at 174.
222. Id. at 177.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 187.
225. Id. at 174.
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However, this affirmative participation right does not comprehend an
ability to prevent standby counsel from also participating in a pro se
defendant’s trial.226 The Court emphasized:
[N]o absolute bar on standby counsel’s unsolicited participation is
appropriate or was intended. The right to appear pro se exists to affirm
the dignity and autonomy of the accused and to allow the presentation of
what may, at least occasionally, be the accused’s best possible defense.
Both of these objectives can be achieved without categorically silencing
standby counsel.227

Thus, while a pro se defendant has the exclusive right to control his
defense, a trial court may force him to share the execution of his defense
with standby counsel.228 The Court cabined stand-by counsel’s unwanted
participation with several limitations, however. It directed that standby
counsel may not “speak instead of the defendant on any matter of
importance.”229 When standby counsel participates over the objection of a
pro se defendant, a Faretta violation will depend on the defendant’s loss of
actual or apparent control over her case.230 In addition, to safeguard the
dignity and autonomy of the pro se defendant, a trial court must not allow
unwanted participation by standby counsel “to destroy the jury’s perception
that the defendant is representing himself.”231 This limitation preserves
“the message the defendant wishes to convey,” despite multiple voices
speaking for the defense.232
3. Exegesis of Edwards
Edwards certainly evidences concern for a defendant’s expressive
abilities,233 but an exegesis of this case reveals its dominant concern for
decisional impairment.
The Court observed that “[d]isorganized
thinking, . . . impaired expressive abilities, . . . and other common
symptoms of severe mental illnesses can impair the defendant’s ability to
play the significantly expanded role required for self-representation even if

226. See id. at 176–77, 187–88.
227. Id. at 176–77.
228. In McKaskle, for instance, petitioner Wiggins maintained control over all significant
strategic and tactical decisions, see id. at 186, but both Wiggins and his stand-by counsel
actively participated in the defense, see id. at 172–73, 180–81, 184–86; see also id. at 190–
91 (White, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 178 (majority opinion). The right of a pro se defendant to control his case
applies during the entirety of the trial process and does not depend on the jury’s presence.
See id. at 179; infra note 230.
230. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178. In proceedings outside the presence of the jury, no
Faretta violation will occur so long as a trial court permits a pro se defendant to address the
court freely, and the court resolves all strategic and tactical disagreements in the defendant’s
favor. Id. at 179. In the presence of the jury, no violation occurs when standby counsel
simply assists the pro se defendant in complying with evidentiary rules and rules of
courtroom protocol and procedure. See id. at 183; see also id. at 184.
231. Id. at 178.
232. Id. at 177.
233. See supra notes 31, 33 and accompanying text.
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he can play the lesser role of represented defendant.”234 The Court cited
defendant Edwards’s nonsensical motions, which reflected his disorganized
thinking, as exemplifying this truism.235 Other aspects of the Court’s
opinion also suggest that communicative difficulties should matter
primarily—if not solely—to the extent they indicate cognitive deficits or an
absence of autonomy. In particular, the important relationship between
autonomy and expressive ability is revealed in the Court’s description of the
capacities relevant to representational competence, the sources it selected to
support and illustrate the competence needed to perform basic trial tasks,
and the signals it used to indicate the import of those sources of authority.
The Court expressly tethered necessary trial tasks to decision-making
abilities of a higher order than those required to stand trial. In language that
has now been repeated by state supreme courts around the nation,236 the
Court stated:
In certain instances an individual may well be able to satisfy Dusky’s
mental competence standard, for he will be able to work with counsel at
trial, yet at the same time he may be unable to carry out the basic tasks
needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel.237

This sentence is immediately followed by a citation to Adjudicative
Competence: The MacArthur Studies by Norman Poythress, Richard
Bonnie, John Monahan, Randy Otto, and Steven Hoge238 and a list of
certain cognitive abilities. The Court utilized a “see, e.g.,” signal before its
citation to the MacArthur text,239 signifying that the cited authority clearly
supports the proposition.240
Adjudicative Competence: The MacArthur Studies examines Professor
Bonnie’s conceptual model of adjudicative competence and summarizes
relevant research of the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on
Mental Health and the Law.241 In a series of articles in the early 1990s,242
Bonnie suggested that adjudicative competence—or competence to
participate in one’s defense—should be disaggregated into two concepts: a
foundational concept of competence to assist counsel243 and a contextdependent concept of decisional competence.244 Bonnie suggested that all
234. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (quoting Brief for Am. Psychiatric
Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 32).
235. Id. at 176 app.
236. See, e.g., State v. Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d 600, 609–10 (Mo. 2009) (en banc); State v.
Lane, 707 S.E.2d 210, 219 (N.C. 2011).
237. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 175–76.
238. See id. at 176 (citing POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 29, at 103).
239. Id. at 175–76.
240. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R.1.2(a), at 58–59 (Columbia
Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 20th ed. 2015) [hereinafter THE BLUEBOOK] (explaining the
significance of the “see, e.g.” source in this way: “Use e.g., in combination with see to
introduce an authority that is one of multiple authorities . . . to clearly support the same
proposition”).
241. POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 29, at 56–57 (describing Bonnie’s conceptual model).
242. See Bonnie, supra note 52; Bonnie, supra note 148; Bonnie, supra note 183, at 419.
243. See Bonnie, supra note 52, at 554–55, 561–67.
244. See id. at 554–56, 567–87.
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defendants must possess competence to assist counsel, while only those
defendants called upon to make decisions during an adjudication must
possess decisional competence.245 Competence to assist counsel, according
to Bonnie, requires the capacities to understand the nature and purpose of
the criminal process, appreciate one’s potential jeopardy, and identify and
communicate relevant information to counsel.246 Decisional competence,
on the other hand, includes those abilities required for legally valid decision
making.247
Bonnie proposed a number of tests for decisional competence that vary
by the decision at issue and whether the defendant’s decision is in accord
with counsel’s advice.248 In order to waive counsel and proceed pro se,
Bonnie argued that a defendant should possess the capacity to make
reasoned choices.249 He defined this standard of decisional competence to
include the following functional elements:
expression of choice,
understanding of factual information, appreciation of that information for
the defendant’s own case, and rational manipulation of information.250 In
essence, Bonnie proposed that, to waive counsel, a defendant should be
capable of using logical processes to compare the benefits and risks of
options in a decisional framework free of delusional beliefs or pathological
emotions.251 I have argued elsewhere that, while Bonnie’s framework is
groundbreaking and important, his proposed standard for waiver of counsel
is insufficient for the specific context of self-representation and that the
standard should include a broader set of problem-solving abilities.252
Regardless, the U.S. Supreme Court signaled its endorsement of
Bonnie’s framework of adjudicative competence and, perhaps, that the
decisional competence standard that he suggested should be necessary for
self-representation. In particular, the Court quoted the MacArthur work for
the proposition that “[w]ithin each domain of adjudicative competence
(competence to assist counsel; decisional competence) the data indicate that
understanding, reasoning, and appreciation [of the charges against a
defendant] are separable and somewhat independent aspects of functional
legal ability.”253 In this way, the Court recognized that cognitive abilities
of a higher order are necessary for representational competence than to
stand trial. This language also communicates that if a defendant lacks these
decisional capacities—and, by implication, only such capacities—he will be
“unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense
without the help of counsel.”254
245. See id. at 548, 568.
246. Id. at 562–63.
247. Id. at 548.
248. See id. at 576–80.
249. See id. at 579. Bonnie acknowledged that self-representation at trial may require
additional abilities related to performance. See id. at 557 n.68.
250. See id. at 571–72.
251. See id. at 574–75.
252. See Johnston, supra note 193.
253. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (citation omitted).
254. Id. at 175–76.
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Further, directly after its reference to decisional competence and
component cognitive elements, the Court cited McKaskle and listed the trial
tasks that a pro se defendant should be competent to perform.255 These
tasks include “organization of defense, making motions, arguing points of
law, participating in voir dire, questioning witnesses, and addressing the
court and jury.”256 Significantly, the Court selected a “see also” signal to
precede this authority.257 According to the The Bluebook: A Uniform
System of Citation, the “see also” signal “is commonly used to cite an
authority supporting a proposition when authorities that state or directly
support the proposition already have been cited or discussed.”258 The
Court’s use of the “see, e.g.,” signal for the MacArthur work directly
followed by the “see also” signal for McKaskle indicates, though does not
conclusively establish, that the former authority supports the Court’s
proposition about representational competence and the need to ensure that a
pro se defendant is able “to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his
own defense” more directly than the latter authority.259 These signals and
the ordering of authorities also suggest that, in order to be competent to
perform the trial tasks listed in McKaskle, the defendant must have
sufficient decisional competence and cognitive abilities.260
255. Id. at 176 (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 (1984)).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. THE BLUEBOOK, supra note 240, R. 1.2(a), at 46 (“Cited authority constitutes
additional source material that supports the proposition. ‘See also’ is commonly used to cite
an authority supporting a proposition when authorities that state or directly support the
proposition already have been cited or discussed.”); see also Ira P. Robbins, Semiotics,
Analogical Legal Reasoning, and the Cf. Citation: Getting Our Signals Uncrossed, 48
DUKE L.J. 1043, 1073 (1999) (discussing implications of the “see also” signal).
259. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 175–76; THE BLUEBOOK, supra note 240, R. 1.2, at 5; id. R.
1.2(a), at 46. The U.S. Supreme Court utilizes its own citation manual, which includes
signals. See Email from Todd Venie to E. Lea Johnston (June 4, 2015, 5:09 PM) (conveying
the contents of an oral conversation with a librarian at the U.S. Supreme Court, who relayed
that the Court does have a citation manual, maintained by the Reporter of Decisions, that
defines signals, “and according to the librarian, the definitions of the signals are ‘similar to
The Bluebook’s but not identical’”). The Court does not make this manual available to the
public, however. Id. (reporting that “the manual has an official designation of ‘for internal
use only’ and it is neither published nor distributed to outside parties”). The Court’s internal
manual is not susceptible to a request under the Freedom of Information Act. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (2012) (providing the public the right to request access to records from any federal
agency); 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(B) (providing that “agency” does not include courts of the
United States). Because the public will only have access to publicly available citation
manuals—and The Bluebook is the most widely used legal citation manual, see DEBORAH E.
BOUCHOUX, CITE-CHECKER: YOUR GUIDE TO USING THE BLUEBOOK 1 (3d ed. 2011) (“The
Bluebook remains the gold standard for citation throughout the United States.”)—it makes
sense to construe the meaning of signals in Supreme Court opinions by The Bluebook. Cf.
Robbins, supra note 258, at 1058 (using The Bluebook as a means to explore the varying use
of the “cf.” signal by courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, and observing that “[i]n the
bulk of cases, courts follow the definitions set out in successive editions of The Bluebook
and attempt to construct analogies that represent positive authority for the proposition
offered”).
260. An alternative reading, however, is that competence “to carry out the basic tasks
needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel” consists both of decisional
competence and performance competence, i.e., competence to actually perform the decisions
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These observations support the notion that communication problems are
relevant to representational competence to the extent that they expose or
reflect disordered thinking or other deficits in decision-making, problemsolving, or cognitive abilities. To be clear, Edwards does not answer the
question of whether a communication difficulty in an absence of cognitive
deficiencies may support a denial of self-representation. That issue was
simply not presented in Edwards.261 McKaskle, in differentiating control
from performance in self-representation, suggests that answer should be
“no.”262 Faretta is also consistent with this approach.263
III. RAMIFICATIONS FOR
REPRESENTATIONAL COMPETENCE STANDARDS
Applying the normative lens and the Supreme Court’s guidance on the
scope of the self-representation right to the four categories of
communication impairments outlined in Part I.D yields several conclusions
relevant to the constitutionality of current state representational competence
standards. A communication deficiency should support a finding of
representational incompetence only to the extent that the deficiency either
reveals an absence of meaningful autonomy or poses a grave threat to the
reliability or the actual or apparent fairness of the adjudication. The four
categories of communication deficiencies—involving disordered speech, an
inability to be understood by courtroom actors, an inability to communicate
in a timely fashion within the particular context of trial, and suboptimal
advocacy—hold varying relationships to mental illness and cognitive
impairment and thus offer differing implications for a defendant’s
autonomous potential. They also differ in the extent to which they may be
ameliorated by standby or hybrid counsel and so vary in their necessary
relationship to the fairness or accuracy of an adjudication. After evaluating
the constitutional significance of each subset of communication
impairment, this part concludes by exploring the implications for existing
state representational competence standards. It also proposes a two-part
representational competence standard that coheres with Supreme Court
precedent and the values animating representational competence.

reached as to these trial tasks. See Edwards, 554 U.S. at 175–76. If the Court had wanted to
list two distinct areas of functional competence that are both relevant to representational
competence, however, then the clearest way to do so would have been to list McKaskle
behind the McArthur Studies authority within the same “see, e.g.,” signal. See THE
BLUEBOOK, supra note 240, R. 1.2, at 58–59 (providing an example of the “see, e.g.,” signal
to introduce a series of authorities that each clearly support the same proposition with each
authority separated by a semicolon). In addition, this alternative reading seems unreasonable
in light of Faretta’s directive that trial courts should not demand strong advocacy skills
when deciding whether to permit self-representation. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
836 (1975).
261. See Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176 app.
262. See supra Part II.B.2.
263. See supra Part II.B.1.
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A. Necessary Causal Predicate of Severe Mental Illness
A critical threshold issue—which states have addressed in different
ways264—is whether to limit cognizable deficiencies to those resulting from
mental illness or “severe” mental illness. Edwards limited its holding to
deficits that stem from severe mental illness and thus appears to require
causation as an essential element of representational incompetence.265 This
requirement is not surprising: causation is one of the defining hallmarks of
legal competency standards in civil and criminal contexts,266 and most
competency standards require that legally recognized deficiencies originate
from mental illness or mental disability.267 Indeed, some commentators
have argued that depriving an individual of a constitutional right in the
Case law
absence of mental impairment is unconstitutional.268
demonstrates that an individual’s underlying condition must be enduring
and beyond his ability to alter or control.269
Moreover, limiting the legal recognition of incompetence to functional
deficits stemming from mental disability accords due respect for a
defendant’s autonomy. A fundamental tenet of mental health law is that
“the legally relevant behavior of mentally disordered persons is a product of
their mental disorder and not of their free choice.”270 A state’s power to
deprive an incompetent defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to control
his defense—and to impose a substitute decision maker on the defendant—
extends from its parens patriae authority.271 Therefore, the justification for

264. See supra notes 48–49, 124–25 and accompanying text.
265. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177–78 (2008) (“[T]he Constitution permits
States to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial
under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not
competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.”). Other language in the decision,
however, is not as clear. For instance, the Court does not reject Indiana’s proposed standard
of “coherent communication” as constitutionally impermissible for failing to include a
mental illness or disability element. See id. at 178.
266. See THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND
INSTRUMENTS 29–32 (Kluwer Academic 2d ed. 2003); see also Stephen J. Morse, Crazy
Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527,
539 (1978) (“The structure of all mental health laws is fundamentally the same: all require
findings of (1) a mental disorder; (2) a behavioral component; and (3) a causal connection
between the mental disorder and the behavioral component (at least in principle).”).
267. GRISSO, supra note 266, at 29.
268. See S. J. Anderer, Development of an Instrument to Evaluate the Capacity of Elderly
Persons to Make Personal Care and Financial Decisions 7–8 (May 1997) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Allegheny Univ. of Health Scis.) (on file with the Hahnemann Library, Drexel
University); id. at 5 & n.24; see also In re Conservatorship of Goodman, 766 P.2d 1010,
1011–12 (Okla. Civ. App. 1988) (“If a purpose of the statute is to allow involuntary
intervention in the property affairs of citizens, absent a finding of mental incompetence, it is
unconstitutional as it is a clear violation of the State and Federal Constitutional provisions
which guarantee every citizen the right to life, liberty and property.”); State ex rel. Shamblin
v. Collier, 445 S.E.2d 736 (W. Va. 1994).
269. See Jennifer Moye, Guardianship and Conservatorship, in GRISSO, supra note 266,
at 326.
270. Morse, supra note 266, at 539 n.19.
271. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37
VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1772 (1992) (“The parens patriae power allows government to engage
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a state’s intervention should be to protect the defendant from decisions that
stem from illness or disability rather than from those that are the product of
the individual’s free will.272 Put simply, individuals capable of rational,
autonomous decision making should not have to suffer the state’s
“protection” or the abdication of their ability to make choices. Requiring a
demonstration that a functional disability stems from a mental disorder or
disability should go far in restricting the application of the state’s parens
patriae power to its legitimate boundaries and “prevent the application of
the incapacity standard to those whose decisions are merely eccentric or
unpopular.”273 A court has other tools besides findings of incompetence to
deal effectively with disruptive or obstreperous behavior that is the product
of a defendant’s conscious, rational will.274 Requiring a causation
component thus serves as an important safeguard of a defendant’s
autonomy and prevents excessive state paternalism.
Limiting findings of representational incompetence to cases involving
mental illness or disability also respects the general tenet, applicable to
other fundamental rights,275 that the state should not deprive an individual
of a fundamental right unless it uses the least restrictive means available to
effectuate a compelling state interest.276 Indeed, this principle arguably
supplies the most compelling reason why impairments unrelated to mental
illness should not provide a basis for precluding self-representation. If a
person is capable of making rational decisions, a court should honor those
decisions even if he requires assistance in executing them.277 In the context
of a guardianship determination, one court explained:
The capability to manage one’s person does not resolve itself upon the
question of whether the individual can accomplish tasks without
assistance but rather whether that individual has the capability to take care

in decisionmaking in the best interest of persons who by reason of age or disability are
incapable of making such decisions for themselves.”).
272. See Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, 1 CAN. J. PHIL. 105, 115 (1971) (arguing that
there must be “further evidence of derangement, or illness, or severe depression, or
unsettling excitation” before an individual’s actions may be deemed involuntary).
273. Anderer, supra note 268, at 6.
274. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970).
275. See Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 227, 229–30, 233 (2006) (observing that the Court does not apply strict scrutiny
review to possible infringements of the Sixth Amendment but rather employs “categorical
rules to ‘implement’” Sixth Amendment rights including the right to counsel). Selfrepresentation is a fundamental right. See Martinez v. California, 528 U.S. 152 (2000)
(noting that “we found in Faretta that the right to defend oneself at trial is ‘fundamental’ in
nature”); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 817 (1975).
276. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (“[A]ny classification which
serves to penalize the exercise of [a constitutional] right, unless shown to be necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.”); Adam Winkler, Fatal in
Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts,
59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800–01 (2006).
277. See Moye, supra note 269, at 311–12; Anderer, supra note 268, at 7.
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and intelligently direct that all his needs are met through whatever device
is reasonably available under the circumstances.278

The principle of the least restrictive alternative also helps to define the types
of mental disorders that supply the predicate for Edwards’s application, i.e.,
mental disorders that profoundly impair a person and are not susceptible to
reasonable accommodation. Finally, the tenet illuminates why courts
should often permit even individuals with serious mental illnesses to
represent themselves.279
As previously discussed, most states have construed Edwards as carving
out a limitation to Faretta that applies only to gray-area defendants
suffering from a severe mental illness.280 Critically, however, the meaning
of the term “severe mental illness” is unclear. The defendant in Edwards
had schizophrenia,281 and presumably schizophrenia, at least when the
disorder has been experienced for a certain duration and has resulted in a
certain level of functional impairment, qualifies as a severe mental illness.
The status of other mental illnesses, however, particularly those that do not
carry symptoms of psychosis, is uncertain.282 In particular, it is unclear
whether personality disorders can ever qualify as severe mental illnesses.
Most courts that have addressed the question have held that they do not, but
their findings on this issue are muddled or have been limited to the specific
diagnoses before them.283 Therefore, it is currently difficult to discern, in

278. In re McPeak’s Estate, 368 N.E.2d 957, 960 (Ill. App. 1977). See also infra note 304
(listing cases that construe the Due Process Clause to limit the scope of a guardian’s decision
making powers to a ward’s incompetence).
279. The thoughts of Chris Slobogin substantially enriched this paragraph.
280. See supra notes 48–49, 124–25 and accompanying text.
281. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 169, 177–78 (2008).
282. See, e.g., People v. Scott, No. 1-11-2267, 2013 Ill. App. LEXIS 2071, at *6 (Ill. App.
Ct. Sept. 16, 2013) (“Those cases relying on Edwards that have found that defendant was
properly denied the right to proceed pro se, involved defendants who were diagnosed with
schizophrenia and refused to take medication, or who suffered from a severe mental illness
with paranoid ideation. Here, there is no indication that defendant was diagnosed with a
mental illness and the report entered on his fitness to stand trial shows that he was not
prescribed psychotropic medication.” (citation omitted)); State v. Scott, No. 2014–KA–0599,
2015 WL 1880509, *7 (La. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2015) (stressing the absence of a psychotic
disorder when finding that the defendant did not have a major or significant mental illness).
Notably, however, other mental disorders, such as anxiety-related disorders, can significantly
impair one’s capacity to sustain ongoing decision making at trial or perform other essential
functions. Several state courts have struggled over whether certain mental disorders qualify
as “severe mental illnesses,” but I have been unable to locate any opinion that defines
“severe mental illness” or significantly illuminates its contours. See, e.g., State v. McCullah,
797 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010) (anxiety, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and
antisocial personality disorder); State v. Jason, 779 N.W.2d 66, 76 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009)
(Asperger’s syndrome).
283. See, e.g., Falcone v. State, 227 P.3d 469, 470–73 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010)
(acknowledging that antisocial personality disorder and polysubstance dependence were not
serious mental illnesses, but refusing to limit representational incompetence to individuals
with serious mental illness); McCullah, 829 N.W.2d 131 (affirming the trial court’s decision
that antisocial personality disorder does not constitute a severe mental illness); see also
United States v. McKinney, 737 F.3d 773, 778–79 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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advance of a court’s ruling on the issue, whether a particular diagnosis may
supply a possible predicate for representational incompetence.284
B. Disordered Speech
The values animating representational competence and the Court’s
language in Edwards and McKaskle converge to support the conclusion that
disordered speech may, so long as it stems from a severe mental illness and
reflects significant cognitive impairment,285 provide a valid basis for
denying self-representation.286 The Court in McKaskle established that the
“core” of the self-representation right is the right to control one’s
defense,287 a right that necessarily depends on an individual’s autonomy
and ability to make self-interested decisions.288 Disordered speech, often

284. The definition that a court should adopt for “severe mental illness” is also unclear.
A range of choices that vary in diagnosis, durational component, and level of disability are
possible. See, e.g., John J. Spollen III, M.D., Perspectives in Serious Mental Illness,
MEDSCAPE PSYCHIATRY (May 20, 2003), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/
455449#vp_1 (“[T]he most consistent definitions of [Serious and Persistent Mental Illness]
include a diagnosis of nonorganic psychosis, functional disability in areas of social and
occupational functioning, and a prolonged illness and long-term treatment. It includes many
patients with schizophrenia, but also people with bipolar disorder, severe major depression,
and, in some less frequently used definitions of [Serious and Persistent Mental Illness],
substance use and personality disorders.”) [https://perma.cc/YTB5-JPC5]; Arie P. Schinnar
et al., An Empirical Literature Review of Definitions of Severe and Persistent Mental Illness,
147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1602 (1990) (comparing seventeen definitions of severe and
persistent mental illness used in the United States between 1972 and 1987, and concluding
that the definition with the greatest consensus, and most representative of the middle range
of prevalence, was the 1987 definition forged by the National Institute of Mental Health);
NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, TOWARDS A MODEL FOR COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITYBASED MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 14–16 (1987); Mirella Ruggeri et al., Definition and
Prevalence of Severe and Persistent Mental Illness, 177 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 149, 149
(2000) (explaining that the 1987 National Institute of Mental Health definition of severe
mental illness involves a diagnosis of nonorganic psychosis or personality disorder; a
durational component of “prolonged illness and long-term treatment” that has been
operationalized as requiring at least two years of mental illness or treatment; and a certain
level of disability, characterized as including at least three of eight specified criteria); Health
Care Reform for American with Severe Mental Illnesses: Report of the National Advisory
Mental Health Council, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1447, 1448 (1993) (citing Mental Illness in
America: A Series of Public Hearings Before the S. Comm. On Appropriations, 103d Cong.
45 (2003)) (“Severe mental illness is defined through diagnosis, disability, and duration, and
includes disorders with psychotic symptoms such as schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder,
manic depressive disorder, autism, as well as severe forms of other disorders such as major
depression, panic disorder, and obsessive compulsive disorder.”).
285. See supra Part III.A.
286. See Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176 (emphasizing that “[d]isorganized thinking [and]
impaired expressive abilities . . . can impair the defendant’s ability to play the significantly
expanded role required for self-representation even if he can play the lesser role of
represented defendant” (quoting Brief for Am. Psychiatric Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae,
supra note 32, at 26)).
287. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984).
288. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 180, at 465 (“[R]ationality . . . is the embodiment of
autonomy, in the double sense that without it we will fritter away our capacity for future
autonomy, and that irrationality is a symptom of forfeited autonomy. . . . An irrational
individual . . . cannot be said to be choosing his or her actions.”); Feinberg, supra note 272,
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the best evidence of disordered thinking,289 may suggest impaired cognitive
processes and, possibly, a diminished ability to recognize and advance
one’s best interests. To the extent that a defendant’s statements or decisions
are untethered from a reasoned thought process, they do not reflect a
meaningful expression of autonomy and do not warrant deference. In this
situation, a defendant is neither competent to control, nor conduct, his
defense. Thus, adequate grounds for a paternalistic intervention exist, and a
court is warranted in appointing counsel to usurp the defendant’s decisionmaking authority and assume control over his defense.290
For this conclusion to apply, however, disordered speech must truly be
“disordered” and must reflect, or coexist with, serious cognitive
impairment. The DSM-5 recognizes that “mildly disorganized speech is
common and nonspecific”; therefore, symptoms of disordered speech—
whether involving tangentiality, loose associations, derailment, or
incoherence—must be severe enough to “substantially impair effective
communication.”291 Many pro se defendants are relatively uneducated,
have poor literacy, and are unversed in the law.292 Their oral and written
communications are likely to be disjointed, tangential, and poorly worded;
they may even be irrelevant or unsupported by the law.293 Before
withholding a defendant’s right to control his defense on grounds of poorly
drafted pleadings or unartful exchanges with the court, the court should
make a finding that the defendant’s speech rises to the level of disordered,
results from a severe mental illness, and either demonstrates or coexists
with serious cognitive impairments that call into question his ability to

at 111–12 (discussing rationality and self-interest as necessary predicates for voluntary or
nearly voluntary decisions).
289. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (quoting the DSM-5).
290. See Luban, supra note 180, at 465 (endorsing Thompson’s three conditions for a
paternalistic intervention); Dennis F. Thompson, Paternalism in Medicine, Law, and Public
Policy, in ETHICS TEACHING IN HIGHER EDUCATION 246, 250–51 (D. Callahan & S. Bok eds.,
1980) (expressing three conditions for paternalism: “[f]irst, the decision of the person who
is to be constrained must be impaired; . . . [s]econd, the restriction is as limited as
possible[;] . . . [f]inally, the restriction prevents a serious and irreversible harm”). Indeed,
such a defendant may be incompetent to proceed, and a court should consider reevaluating
his competence to stand trial at this point.
291. DSM-5, supra note 128, at 88.
292. See, e.g., People v. Thomas, No. F063867, 2013 WL 5652504, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 17, 2013) (pro se defendant had not completed high school and admitted to reading
below an eleventh-grade level); State v. Bell, 53 So.3d 437, 450, 457 (La. 2010) (pro se
defendant read at second-grade level according to psychiatric evaluation); State v. Lane, 707
S.E.2d 210, 216 (N.C. 2011) (trial court found “[pro se] defendant’s ‘literacy level at best
would be found to be at the third grade level,’ but is ‘probably or more likely in the range of
kindergarten through the second grade’”).
293. See, e.g., People v. Koontz, 46 P.3d 335, 356 (Cal. 2002) (noting that the pro se
defendant had “a proclivity to boast or exaggerate, a tendency to digress in argument, a
shaky grasp of the legal concept of relevancy, and even a certain tangentiality in speech
patterns”); People v. Foster, No. A134210, 2013 WL 5503153, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 4,
2013) (pro se defendant’s conduct during opening statement included irrelevant statements
and exhibited unfamiliarity with the law); People v. Miranda, No. B256806, 2015 WL
2255077, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. May 13, 2015) (pro se defendant was often “inarticulate and
ineffective”).
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This procedure would
identify and advance his best interests.294
demonstrate due regard for the dignity and autonomy of the defendant, the
dictates of Faretta, and the parameters of Edwards.
C. Inability to Be Understood by Courtroom Actors
On the other hand, denying the right to control one’s defense on the basis
of speech unintelligible to courtroom actors is often unnecessary and
insufficiently respectful of a defendant’s autonomy and constitutional right
to self-representation. As discussed in Part I.D.2, a number of impediments
can result in incomprehensible speech. These conditions include speech
impediments, tic disorders, Parkinson’s disease, soft speech, and a thick
foreign accent.295 Impairments in this category often will not reflect any
cognitive deficits, even when they stem from a mental illness.296
A judge can often remedy communication problems of this sort by
appointing a professional to translate or execute the decisions of the
defendant.297 If the individual merely has a strong foreign accent that
impedes understanding by courtroom actors, the court should appoint an
interpreter. Indeed, such an individual may have a due process right to an
interpreter to effectuate his right to self-representation, just as he may to
carry out his rights to testify and cross-examine hostile witnesses and to
ensure the provision of a fair trial.298
If an individual suffers from an impediment that allows him to
communicate with counsel but inhibits effective oral communication with
courtroom actors, then the court should consider appointing hybrid counsel
to execute the defendant’s decisions, assuming they are competently

294. To the extent that a defendant’s communications are intelligible to hybrid counsel
but unintelligible to a court, jury, or witnesses (and do not reflect serious cognitive
impairment), the discussion in Part III.C is applicable. In particular, a court should honor a
defendant’s decisions to the extent that he does not have serious deficits in thinking,
reasoning, or problem solving and can communicate his decisions to a functionary of the
court at, or perhaps before, trial. If he is unable to communicate them in an intelligible
fashion to witnesses or the trier of fact, a court should authorize hybrid counsel to carry out
his defense consistently with his instructions.
295. See supra Part I.D.2.
296. For instance, tic disorders, such as Tourette’s disorder or persistent vocal tic
disorder, are recognized mental disorders but are not associated with cognitive impairments.
See DSM-5, supra note 128, at 81–82 (detailing diagnostic criteria and features of tic
disorders). The same may be true for childhood-onset fluency disorder (stuttering). See id. at
45–46 (detailing diagnostic criteria and features of childhood-onset fluency disorder).
297. See United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 250 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987) (“Any
limitations due to physical or educational impairments that do not affect the ability of the
accused to choose self-representation over counsel can probably be overcome, if necessary,
through the use of stand-by counsel or interpreters. Such aids may be provided even over
the objection of the accused.”).
298. See, e.g., United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1181 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing
the right to testify); United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 470 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curium)
(collecting cases); United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1973); United States ex
rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1970) (discussing due process).

2164

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

made.299 Because the defendant’s competence to stand trial is not at issue,
his powers of communication will necessarily allow him to communicate
effectively with appointed counsel.300 The extent to which satisfaction of
Dusky’s communication requirement permits a defendant to communicate
adequately with hybrid counsel during the course of trial is an unknown
empirical matter. The answer likely depends on the timing, frequency, and
content of communications about strategic and tactical decisions.301 It is
possible that a defendant’s communicative abilities could suffice for relay
of key details about an alleged criminal incident for purposes of
competence to stand trial, for instance, but be inadequate to express trial
decisions because the latter communications require more nuance or
conveyance in a shorter time frame. To the extent this is the case, the
portion of the discussion in Part III.D pertaining to impairments affecting a
defendant’s ability to communicate in a timely fashion with hybrid counsel
is applicable.
The Court’s fracturing of the self-representation right into control and
performance aspects in McKaskle supports the use of hybrid counsel to
This
compensate for a defendant’s communicative problems.302
differentiation also reflects the reality that denying self-representation on
competence grounds can involve two distinct paternalistic interventions:
denial of a right to control one’s defense and denial of a right to execute it.
A paternalist intervention is justified only to the extent that constraints on
an individual’s liberty are as limited as possible.303 When a defendant lacks
the ability to make sound decisions, the state is justified in appointing
counsel to exercise surrogate decision making and both to control and
conduct the defense. On the other hand, when an individual lacks sufficient
ability to conduct his defense—but possesses all cognitive abilities
necessary to reach sound defense decisions—the state is only justified in
denying his participation right. Because the defendant is of sound mind, no
justification exists for usurping his decision-making authority. In this

299. See Johnston, supra note 4, at 582–83 (suggesting that “a pro se defendant with a
communication-related deficiency should have a due process right to standby counsel or
some other agent to effectuate his decisions in order to honor his constitutional right to selfrepresentation”); see also supra note 298 and accompanying text; cf. Savage v. Estelle, 924
F.2d 1459, 1466 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that the defendant “has not asked for and would
clearly not benefit” from the assistance of “a sign language interpreter, or some other
mechanical or non-mechanical means of rapid communication”); id. at 1464 n.11 (observing
that “the trial court attempted to ensure that Savage’s right to represent himself was denied
only to the extent that his physical characteristics rendered him unable to present his own
defense” and that the defendant was permitted to file motions pro se and to ask questions to
witnesses through appointed cocounsel).
300. See supra note 26 (defining the Dusky standard of competence to stand trial).
301. For instance, if a pro se defendant need only communicate key strategic and tactical
decisions to standby counsel prior to trial, then he may not need greater communication
abilities than Dusky requires.
302. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174, 176–77 (1984).
303. See Luban, supra note 180, at 465 (endorsing the notion that “the constraints
imposed on an individual’s liberty must be as limited and temporary as possible”);
Thompson, supra note 290, at 251.
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situation, the state should appoint hybrid counsel to execute the pro se
defendant’s strategic and tactical decisions.304
Indeed, McKaskle suggests that a trial court could order standby counsel
to assume greater participation in cases in which a pro se defendant lacks
certain communication skills. The Court highlighted the important role that
standby counsel can play in allowing a defendant to overcome performancerelated obstacles. In an introductory paragraph, McKaskle extended Faretta
by construing the latter as holding that “an accused has a Sixth Amendment
right to conduct his own defense, provided only that he knowingly and
intelligently forgoes his right to counsel and that he is able and willing to
abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol.”305 Subsequent cases
have applied this language to preclude self-representation for defendants
with communication-related difficulties such as stuttering or speaking with
a strong foreign accent.306 Later in McKaskle, the Court noted that a trial
court could appoint standby counsel, even over a defendant’s objection, to
ensure his compliance with basic rules of courtroom protocol and
procedure.307 The Court also held that standby counsel could usefully
“assist the defendant in overcoming routine obstacles that stand in the way
of the defendant’s achievement of his own clearly indicated goals.”308
Read together, these passages indicate that a trial court should make
separate assessments of a defendant’s decision-making and performance
abilities and, when a defendant cannot communicate effectively at trial,
should appoint hybrid counsel to enable the exercise of the defendant’s
“core” Faretta right of controlling his defense.309
Notably, the McKaskle Court mentioned in dicta that a defendant does
not have a right to hybrid counsel or to “choreograph special appearances

304. Indeed, extrapolating from guardianship cases holding that due process requires
courts to confine guardians’ decision-making powers to those areas in which a ward suffers
from incapacity, one could argue that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment or due process
right to the assistance of hybrid counsel to execute those decisions that the defendant can
competently make but not execute himself. See, e.g., Guardianship of Hedin v. Gonzales,
528 N.W.2d 567 (Iowa 1995); In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981); In re Guardianship
of Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sur. Ct. 2012).
305. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 173 (emphasis added). In Faretta v. California, the Court
held that “the trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately
engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct” because “[t]he right of self-representation
is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom [nor . . . ] to comply with relevant rules
of procedural and substantive law.” 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975) (emphasis added).
Because this construal took place with no discussion, the requirement that an individual be
“able” to abide by rules of procedure and protocol appears to be an inadvertent expansion of
Faretta. To the extent that the Court in fact extended Faretta, this portion of the Court’s
decision in McKaskle is dicta.
306. Rodriguez v. Castro, 116 F. App’x 865, 867 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing strong
foreign accent); see Savage v. Estelle, 924 F.2d 1459, 1460, 1464 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing
stuttering).
307. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183.
308. Id. at 184. The Court observed that such participation by counsel would present no
“significant interference with the defendant’s actual control over the presentation of his
defense.” Id. at 183.
309. See infra Part III.F.

2166

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

by counsel.”310 Citing this statement, courts across the country have found
that no right to hybrid counsel exists for a pro se defendant.311 If that were
the case, then a greater communicative or performance threshold may be
warranted in a representational competence standard to prevent unreliable
adjudications.312 However, the Supreme Court has never determined the
scope of the pro se right for a defendant with sufficient cognitive abilities
but inadequate communicative abilities to execute his defense, so the
question is an open one. In light of the predominant value of autonomy
endorsed by Faretta and the normative analysis offered above—as well as
the McKaskle Court’s differentiation of control and performance and its
sanctioning of standby counsel to ensure compliance with courtroom
procedure—a credible argument exists that such a pro se defendant would
have a Sixth Amendment or due process right to this assistance. Quite
simply, if a defendant possesses intact decision-making abilities, a decision
to usurp his ability to make defense decisions and deprive him of a
constitutional right cannot be justified. Therefore, to prevent a miscarriage
of justice, a defendant should have a right to assistance in executing his
strategic and tactical choices.
D. Inability to Communicate in a Timely Fashion
Normative concerns, Edwards, and McKaskle also suggest that the third
category of impairments—those inhibiting timely communication within
the context of trial—may support a finding of representational
incompetence so long as those impairments derive from a severe mental
illness.313 This determination turns on whether a defendant possesses the
ability to effectively communicate timely decisions to hybrid counsel.
Impairments that impede timely communication—including, among
others, slowed speech, lengthy pauses, and a need for frequent
clarification—may exist independent of significant deficits in thinking,
reasoning, or judgment.314 When this is the case, a defendant may be able
to reach competent decisions but be unable to verbalize them in a sufficient
310. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183.
311. See Colquitt, supra note 18, at 76–77, 97 n.246.
312. Several commentators have suggested a representational competence standard with
such a communicative element. See Felthous, supra note 4, at 474 (arguing that competency
to waive counsel should include “competency to make and argue one’s own case in the
courtroom; more explicitly, defendant should be able to formulate and present his own
defense with appropriate awareness of courtroom proceedings and decorum; and he should
be capable of cooperating with the judge and other functionaries of the court”); Felthous &
Flynn, supra note 34, at 16 (clarifying this standard in the context of the trial tasks
enumerated in McKaskle); Marks, supra note 4, at 846 (“With regard to interaction and
communication, instead of the ability to ‘consult with his lawyer,’ the self-representing
defendant needs the capacity to communicate defense arguments and positions coherently to
the court and jury and to question witnesses and prospective jurors in a manner that might
reasonably elicit relevant information.”).
313. See supra Part III.A.
314. Cf. supra note 142 (detailing some of the cognitive, affective, and behavioral
impairments that can impair a defendant’s ability to make or execute decisions in a short
timeframe).
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time or manner to participate effectively within the context of trial. As
examined more fully in the previous section, when such a defendant can
communicate decisions in a timely manner to hybrid counsel, hybrid
counsel should operate under a duty to execute those decisions.315
However, if a defendant lacks the ability to convey effectively his wishes
to hybrid counsel, a court should deny self-representation and authorize
counsel both to control and conduct trial tactics, assuming the defendant is
competent to stand trial.316 In this instance, respect for the autonomy of the
defendant should lead courts, as a matter of discretion and consistent with a
client-oriented model of representation, to encourage attorneys to honor
decisions of great personal significance to the defendant that can be made
competently prior to trial.317 Decisions of high personal value may include
selection of the defense and potentially which witnesses to call.318 If
decisions of such a nature are at issue in a given case, the court should
encourage counsel to respect the defendant’s decisions on those issues.319
If new information arises at trial that casts the wisdom of a prior decision
into doubt, counsel could request a brief continuance to discuss the issue
with the defendant. Allowing such a gray-area defendant to make decisions
of strong personal significance prior to trial could pose efficiency and
practicality issues for trial management, but such a stance would be most
respectful to a defendant’s autonomy, should not pose a significant threat to
the fairness or accuracy of a proceeding, and would reduce the sting of the
denial of the pro se right.320

315. See supra notes 302–09 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 26 (listing Dusky’s components of the competence to stand trial
standard, which include a “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding”). If a defendant is incapable of communicating
in a timely manner with hybrid counsel at trial, he may or may not meet the minimum
standard of ability to communicate with counsel necessary for satisfaction of the Dusky
standard. See supra notes 300–01 and accompanying text.
317. See Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling:
Reappraisal and
Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990) (evaluating the benefits and disadvantages of
client-centered counseling); Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of
Client-Centered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2006) (exploring the relationship
between client-centered representation and autonomy theory, and proposing a taxonomy of
client-centered lawyering approaches). I am grateful to Richard Bonnie for calling my
attention to the relationship between hybrid counsel and an enhanced client-control model of
representation.
318. Johnston, supra note 4, at 586. Richard Bonnie has identified certain strategic and
tactical decisions that may be of particular import to criminal defendants. See Bonnie, supra
note 52, at 569 & n.110.
319. See Johnston, supra note 4, at 586–87.
320. Cf. Major v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.3d 706, 718, 722 (Ky. 2009) (approving a
trial court’s permitting a defendant who lacked an ability to process information quickly to
direct examinations through prepared questions but authorizing hybrid counsel to perform
other aspects of the defense). The Kentucky constitution grants criminal defendants the right
to proceed with the assistance of hybrid counsel. Id. at 718.

2168

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

E. Suboptimal Advocacy
Defendant characteristics that diminish the likely effectiveness of a
defense—such as low educational attainment, low reading fluency,321 lack
of familiarity with criminal law or procedure,322 or a mere tendency to
ramble, interrupt, or ask repetitive questions of a witness323—generally
should not support a finding of representational incompetence.324 First, to
the extent that these conditions do not flow directly from severe mental
illness, a court would not be able to satisfy the causation requirement of
Edwards.325 Second, and more fundamentally, these conditions affect the
likely success of a pro se defendant’s advocacy; they do not constitute
functional deficits that undermine a defendant’s autonomy or pose a grave
threat to the reliability or the actual or apparent fairness of an adjudication.
None of these conditions necessarily reflect cognitive deficits suggesting
an absence of meaningful autonomy. It is possible that such a relationship
could exist; however, independent evidence (such as a psychological or
psychiatric examination, medical records, or psychological or intellectual
testing) should establish such deficits, and a court should rest its denial of
the right to control one’s defense on those grounds. It is not unusual for an
individual with adequate cognitive abilities to have poor literacy or low
educational attainment; this is an unfortunate result of our social policies
and lingering issues of economic and racial injustice.326 Moreover, the
average layperson is likely unfamiliar with the intricacies of criminal law,
procedure, and trial practice, and his execution of trial tasks such as witness
examination, therefore, likely will be unartful.
For a defendant’s characteristic to pose a “grave threat” to the accuracy
or fairness of an adjudication, that characteristic should be at least
somewhat rare or substantially more serious than the norm.327 Otherwise,
the constitutional right of self-representation would be foreclosed from the
average resident of the United States and would be reserved to the
privileged few. The Supreme Court in Faretta anticipated that a
layperson’s self-representation would often be ineffective, yet held that the
value of autonomy trumped concerns of accuracy or apparent fairness. The
Court further observed that “the help of a lawyer is [generally] essential to

321. To the extent that a defendant lacks the ability to communicate intelligibly with
courtroom actors, but can communicate with hybrid counsel, the discussion in Part III.D is
applicable.
322. See State v. Imani, 786 N.W.2d 40, 54 (Wis. 2010); Pickens v. State, 292 N.W.2d
601, 611 (Wis. 1980); State v. Jackson, 867 N.W.2d 814, 818–19, 824 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015).
323. See Chadwick v. State, 309 S.W.3d 558, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); In re J.G., No.
04-13-00825-CV, 2014 WL 4627599, at *3–4 (Tex. App. Sept. 17, 2014).
324. See Marks, supra note 4, at 846–47.
325. See supra note 265.
326. See FREDERICK J. MORRISON ET AL., IMPROVING LITERACY IN AMERICA 3–7 (2005)
(examining poor literacy rates in the United States, and attributing those rates to a wide
variety of factors, including parenting, preschool environment, socioeconomic forces, and
race/ethnicity).
327. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
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assure the defendant a fair trial.”328 The Court detailed the many pitfalls
that await pro se defendants: an inability to spot fatal deficiencies in the
pleadings, unfamiliarity with rules of evidence, inadequate trial skills, and
lack of knowledge of relevant substantive law.329 The Court observed that
“the ignorant and illiterate, [and] those of feeble intellect,” will be even less
likely to succeed at trial pro se than laypeople with intelligence and
education.330 Yet this general reality—to which the Court again alluded in
McKaskle and Martinez v. California331—did not detract from the natural
right of an individual, if he so chooses, to control his defense.332
F. Implications for State Representational
Competence Standards and Model Approach
The above analysis demonstrates that only a subset of communication
impairments sufficiently imperil a defendant’s autonomy or the accuracy or
fairness of an adjudication to justify a finding of representational
incompetence. To better cohere with the normative underpinnings of
representational competence and Supreme Court case law, states should
revise their competency standards and procedures in several key ways.
First, states should recognize that Edwards’s competence limitation to
self-representation is limited to defendants who have a severe mental
illness. In addition, to ensure that the state’s paternalistic intervention and
denial of a constitutional right are justified—and do not extend to merely
odd forms of thinking or speech—a court should require that any
cognizable impairment or condition actually stem from that severe mental
illness. Courts must define the currently ambiguous term “severe mental
illness” to impart predictability and clarity to the law.333
Second, following the McKaskle Court’s recognition of selfrepresentation as a bundle of rights, courts should assess a defendant’s
competence to control his defense separately from his competence to
conduct it. This dual inquiry is necessary to justify the content and scope of
the state’s paternalist intervention.334 When a defendant’s decision-making
abilities are intact, denying the defendant’s constitutional right to control
his defense—and transferring his authority over defense decisions to an
unwanted attorney—is unwarranted and unjustifiable. Therefore, states
adopting heightened representational competence standards after Edwards
should adopt and articulate separate competency standards for the right to
control one’s defense and the right to conduct it.

328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832 (1975); see also id. at 834.
Id. at 833 n.43.
Id.
528 U.S. 152 (2000).
See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834.
See supra notes 280–84.
See supra note 290.
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Competency to control one’s defense should center on problem-solving
abilities.335 Only when a defendant lacks an ability requisite to decision
making or problem solving may a court justify authorizing an unwanted
third party to make decisions on behalf of the defendant. As I have argued
elsewhere, psychological theories of problem solving suggest that pro se
defendants should possess a range of cognitive, behavioral, and affective
abilities necessary for sound decision making.336 These include the
foundational abilities to perceive problematic situations,337 generate
alternative courses of action,338 and maintain mental organization.339
Additionally, a defendant should possess the ability to identify a plausible
source of the prosecution,340 an ability to gather information to evaluate the
state’s case,341 a willingness to attend to the prosecution,342 and an ability
to withstand the stress of trial.343 For certain critical strategic decisions,
such as selecting the defense to pursue at trial, a defendant should be
capable of justifying the decision with a plausible reason.344 Finally, a
defendant should be capable of conveying his choices to a functionary of
the court, such as hybrid counsel.345 So long as a pro se defendant
possesses these capacities, his self-representation should reflect sufficient
deference to the important principle of autonomy and satisfy minimal
requirements of reliability and fairness.346 A separate article details the
underpinnings and nuances of this position as well as the various abilities
involved.347
If a court finds a defendant incompetent to control his defense,348 it
should deny his pro se request and appoint counsel to represent him. In this

335. As detailed above, disordered speech could support a finding of incompetence to
control one’s defense to the extent that it reflects or coexists with cognitive deficits that
implicate a defendant’s ability to exercise meaningful autonomy.
336. For a detailed evaluation of each component of social problem-solving theory, and
its import for self-representation, see Johnston, supra note 4, at 546–92. Several of the
abilities listed below overlap with those identified by Professor Richard Bonnie as critical to
adjudicative competence, including the capabilities to understand one’s legal situation,
appreciate one’s jeopardy, recognize relevant information, and communicate that
information to counsel. See Bonnie, supra note 52, at 551–52, 561.
337. See Johnston, supra note 4, at 546–53.
338. See id. at 557–61.
339. See id. at 585.
340. See id. at 548.
341. See id. at 554–55.
342. See id. at 546–53.
343. See id. at 585–86.
344. See id. at 566–81.
345. See id. at 587. As discussed in Part III.D, a defendant may be unable to
communicate adequately with counsel if he suffers from an impairment that impedes timely
communication such as a need for frequent clarification.
346. See id. at 532–41.
347. See generally id.
348. A finding of representational incompetence could be based on a determination that
the defendant’s mental condition is likely to deteriorate such that he will be unable to engage
in ongoing decision making throughout the course of the proceeding. See supra text
accompanying notes 342, 346 (arguing that representative competence should include the
abilities to maintain mental organization and withstand the stress of trial). For these
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case, the defendant’s decisional deficits would justify the state’s
paternalism, and the court should authorize counsel to make defense
decisions on the defendant’s behalf.349 Alternatively, if the defendant is
competent to control his defense, but the court harbors concerns about the
defendant’s ability to execute it to a minimal degree, the court may then
assess his competence to conduct his defense. This two-tiered approach,
though not explicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court, is consistent with
Edwards, Faretta, and McKaskle and would serve the goal of avoiding
grossly unfair or inaccurate results while not unduly trammeling the
defendant’s autonomy.350
While formulations could vary, a possible competency standard for the
execution of a defense could assess a defendant’s ability to communicate in
a coherent manner with courtroom actors in the context of trial. Indeed, this
articulation resembles the communicative representational competence
standards adopted in six of the seven states profiled above.351 If a
defendant, although sufficiently autonomous to control his defense, lacks
the ability to communicate coherently with courtroom actors, a court should
honor his right to control his defense but, to the extent warranted, deny his
ability to perform it. As explored above, this could be the case when a
defendant has a speech impediment, a tic disorder, Parkinson’s disease, soft
speech, or a thick foreign accent. It may also be the case when the
defendant interposes long pauses before speaking or speaks intolerably
slowly. In these situations, the court should appoint a professional—such
as an interpreter or hybrid counsel—to execute the decisions of the mentally
competent defendant on significant strategic and tactical matters that the
defendant cannot communicate himself.352
Finally, no state should deny self-representation on the basis of
characteristics that simply diminish the likely effectiveness of a defense,
such as low educational attainment, low reading fluency, lack of familiarity
with criminal law or procedure, or a mere tendency to ramble, interrupt, or
ask repetitive questions of a witness. Many of these conditions do not flow
directly from severe mental illness; moreover, they do not constitute
functional deficits that undermine a defendant’s autonomy or pose a grave
defendants—who may be competent to render reasoned decisions at the moment of a
competency examination but who are denied their pro se right because of an anticipated
inability to maintain mental organization or withstand the stress of trial—a model of clientcentered lawyering may be particularly attractive. See, e.g., supra notes 317–20.
349. Of course a defendant will retain the right to make the few “fundamental” decisions
allocated to the defendant. See Johnston, supra note 4, at 536–37, 337 nn.89–93.
350. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176–77 (2008) (listing the values implicated
by self-representation by a gray-area defendant).
351. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-302 (West 2014); Falcone v. State, 227 P.3d 469, 474
(Alaska Ct. App. 2010); People v. Johnson, 267 P.3d 1125, 1132 (Cal. 2012); State v.
Connor, 973 A.2d 627, 657 (Conn. 2009); State v. Jason, 779 N.W.2d 66, 76 n.2 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2009); Edwards v. State, 902 N.E.2d 821, 829 (Ind. 2009), remanded from 554 U.S.
164 (2008); supra Part I.C.
352. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984) (stating that “the pro se
defendant is entitled to preserve actual control over the case he chooses to present to the
jury” including over all significant strategic and tactical decisions).
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threat to the reliability or fairness of an adjudication. Rather, the Supreme
Court in Faretta anticipated these characteristics and deemed their likely
effect on the accuracy of an adjudication to be subordinate to the
defendant’s autonomy interest in controlling his defense.
Thus,
representational competence standards such as Wisconsin’s—which assess
whether a defendant is capable of “effective communication” and of
offering “a meaningful defense” by considering his education, literacy,
fluency in English, and “any physical or psychological disability which may
significantly affect his ability to communicate a possible defense to the
jury”353—should be abrogated, as they are likely to be unconstitutional as
applied.
CONCLUSION
Following Indiana v. Edwards, states have adopted various standards for
evaluating a defendant’s representational competence. Seven of these
standards include an express communication component, but twenty others
are so vague that they could easily factor a defendant’s expressive abilities
into their calculus. Close analysis of relevant Supreme Court precedent
reveals that only impairments that demonstrate an absence of meaningful
autonomy or that pose a grave threat to the reliability or fairness of an
adjudication should provide a basis for a denial of self-representation on
competency grounds. Moreover, the case of McKaskle v. Wiggins indicates
that courts should comprehend self-representation as a bundle of distinct
rights of control and performance, thus suggesting that states should adopt
separate competency standards to control and conduct a defense. This
Article assesses the constitutional significance of four types of
communication impairments for self-representation and suggests revisions
to existing representational competence standards. It also proposes a twopronged representational competence standard that should withstand
constitutional scrutiny.

353. See Pickens v. State, 292 N.W.2d 601, 611 (Wis. 1980); see also State v. Imani, 786
N.W.2d 40, 53–54 (Wis. 2010).

